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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, I argue for an approach to transitional justice that analyzes the diverse 
and dynamic ways in which people experience armed conflict and its aftermath. I question what 
actually changes during a state’s “transitional period” and illuminate how transitional justice is 
utilized, politicized, and manipulated by powerful actors. Throughout this dissertation, I examine 
the varied experiences of people who endured gross violations of human rights as children, 
according to international law, and who are now, within that legal framework, adults. I follow 
the lives of victims of Nepal’s armed conflict as they transition out of what is recognized in 
international law as a temporary phase known as “childhood” and explore what they recognize as 
constant and temporal in their own lives as the Nepali state undergoes its own transition, also 
argued to be a temporary phase, transitional justice. I inquire how diverse identities and patterned 
inequality are reconstituted through processes of transitional justice and contend the façade of 
the inclusion serves as a distraction from claims for equitable access to power and resources. A 
key argument of this dissertation is that the performance of transitional justice in Nepal, 
including the performance of redressing human rights violations experienced by victims and 
addressing the needs of the most vulnerable victims (e.g. children), functions to conceal 
international complicity in as well as the state’s commitment to maintaining structural inequality. 
Following ten years of armed conflict to ameliorate historically sedimented inequity, state-led 
transitional justice mechanisms have served to entrench the exclusion of economically, 
politically, and socially marginalized groups and ensure Nepalis’ continued distrust in the 
national government. Thus, while addressing structural inequality may be beyond the reach of 
normative transitional justice mechanisms, the Nepali context demonstrates how processes of 
transitional justice cannot redress conflict-era gross violations of human rights without 
redressing inequitable systems of power. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
We are living in a double reality. One reality is I need money, but the other reality is I 
know this is not the best thing that I could be doing in the world. I know that working 
with the UN is not the best option to promote peace in the world, but there is not an 
alternative option. There are very excellent, good, and best people in the UN, but they are 
not in the capacity to change the whole system. The system is so big that when you enter 
into it, you are trapped. You are not allowed to write papers. When you are in the UN, 
your freedom is gone. You cannot write any articles in the newspaper. It would have to 
go to New York to get approval from the communications section. Once they approve it, 
you can do that. So, once you are in the UN, you're trapped and your personal freedom is 
gone. You are everywhere traced, you are coined as a particular brand, you're not allowed 
to interact with certain people. So, you are something different, more animal than human. 
Even from that level, again, I will say there is no option...There are some organizations 
that are trying hard to develop an alternative model, but they are not succeeding because 
they always have to please the powerful who have money. And the source of power, to 
my mind, is very disintegrated. The people who have arms, the people who have money, 
and the people who have these two big things are the power. So, those who have more 
arms, more money are powerful, and they have the power of coercion, not the power of 
peace. So, that’s the world. We cannot change it. 
 
I was sitting next to Udaya,1 one of the primary people in charge of implementing peace 
education programs and curricula in Nepal. She was an educated, English speaking, and by 
international development standards, successful Nepali woman who had agreed to meet me at her 
office for an interview in July 2013. We were in a conference room sitting at the far end of a 
long table in a building used for the day-to-day activities of an international non-governmental 
organization.  
I was surprised that Udaya was saying these things to me. I had started to expect that staff 
from organizations involved in transitional justice and peacebuilding would interact with me in 
ways that seemed like a performance for donors evaluating the implementation of their 
programs. Processes of transitional justice, typically implemented after an armed conflict, aim to 
redress violations of humanitarian and human rights law as well as facilitate justice, 
reconciliation, and democratic political transitions. These processes may include prosecutions, 
truth-telling, reparations, vetting, memorials, and the reform of government institutions. 
Peacebuilding processes, under which peace education would typically be categorized, aim to 
establish peace and prevent the resurgence of armed conflict. The United Nations (UN), 																																																								
1 The names of all interviewees in this dissertation are pseudonyms. 
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powerful international donors, and international non-governmental organizations typically offer 
financial and logistical support for peacebuilding and transitional justice. Udaya’s statement was 
her response when I strayed from my interview schedule and asked her how people make sense 
of the contradictions in transitional justice and peacebuilding work. In the response quoted 
above, she described what came to be common themes during my research.  
One such theme, in various iterations, is money. Although Udaya didn’t believe that the 
work she was doing would make the world a better place or create world peace, one reason she 
was working on peace education was the salary it provided her. For her, this constituted two 
realities. In one reality, she must justify her work to herself and its funders, because she needs 
the money that her job (promoting peace) provides. On the other hand, she knows that there are 
better alternatives to the UN, donor, and international non-governmental organization models for 
transitional justice and peacebuilding. Yet, there is a larger system that even “excellent, good, 
and best people” cannot change because powerful actors prevent it.  
Processes of transitional justice are intimately connected to a liberal peacebuilding model 
touting freedom as a primary goal. Freedom, in this context, is defined in terms of individual 
citizens’ ability to democratically elect leaders to “represent” them. According to this definition, 
nation-states ideally transition from previously repressive modes of governance to liberal 
democracies, and perpetrators of human rights violations that occurred under previously 
repressive regimes are prosecuted. Hypothetically, in this model, if individual citizens are given 
the right to vote and perpetrators of human rights violations are prosecuted, then the violations 
will be redressed and peace will be sustained through democracy. Yet, Udaya said, “when you’re 
in the UN, your freedom is gone” and described people working in the UN system as “trapped” 
even as they are promoting freedom and democracy. It is within this framework that less 
powerful nations are forced to comply in order to receive international aid. Calling such political 
transitions “democratic” is somewhat ironic given that national leaders are beholden to powerful 
nations rather than accountable to their own citizens.  
Udaya’s perspective evokes two additional themes I encountered during my research: 
power and the lack of alternatives. A common thread in my interviews with victims, Nepali 
politicians, diplomats, donors, UN staff, and people implementing state-led mechanisms of 
transitional justice is some iteration of a lack of alternatives and feeling as if they are trapped in a 
system in which more powerful actors control outcomes and systemically prevent meaningful 
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transitions that would improve the lives of Nepalis. However, these powerful actors seemed 
elusive. I kept seeking someone who would claim responsibility or power over processes of 
transitional justice in Nepal to no avail. In Udaya’s comments, these powerful actors are 
anonymous, identified only as “the people who have arms” and “the people who have money.” 
The power, she says, is of coercion and not of peace: “So that’s the world. We cannot change it.” 
Her job is implementing education programs in Nepal as a mechanism to promote peace after the 
cessation of Nepal’s ten-year (1996-2006) internal armed conflict between the Communist Party 
of Nepal-Maoist and the Nepal government. The view she expressed to me would not be 
implemented into any peace education program nor would she would express it openly to staff at 
donor agencies, international non-governmental organizations, or the UN. It’s a contradiction she 
tries to make sense of as she is doing this work “for peace.” She does it for the money. She does 
it, she said, because there is no possible alternative.  
I scheduled an interview with Udaya because I had been told during my preliminary 
research in 2013 by staff at various organizations and government offices that children were, 
along with women, the “most affected” by Nepal’s armed conflict. As I began researching how 
children were affected and what mechanisms or programs were implemented on their behalf, 
however, additional themes became apparent. One, there was no agreed upon definition of 
“children” or “conflict affected children” by those implementing programs for those groups. 
And, further, most organizations implementing peacebuilding programs or transitional justice 
mechanisms didn’t have a “transitioning” definition of children. By this I mean that the children 
they spoke of in interviews and conversations didn’t seem to age. They were presented as static, 
frozen in time.  
During my preliminary research, two other key themes were present in interviews, 
conversations, and my observations that align with existing literature on transitional justice in 
Nepal: inequality and the perceived problem of caste and ethnic identity within the nation-state. 
Ethnicity and caste are closely linked to vast economic, social, and political inequality. Scholars 
have criticized transitional justice policy and practice, particularly in Nepal, for its elitism and 
failure to redress hierarchies of power and inequality (Robins 2011, 2012, 2013; Sajjad 2013, 
2016). Although transitional justice is often presented in official documents and webpages 
produced by UN organizations and international non-governmental organizations as neutral, 
existing scholarship has illuminated how it is inescapably political (Hazan 2017) and examined 
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the ways in which international influences over processes of transitional justice reinforce unequal 
systems of power (Ní Aoláin 2009; Wilson 2001). Within the liberal democratic peacebuilding 
approach, ethnic and caste identity is a problem in Nepal insofar as it must be accommodated to 
fit into a nationalist model of governance. There is a long history of power struggles related to 
diverse identities and inequality in Nepal deeply connected to the armed conflict, and, as I argue, 
processes of transitional justice. A key argument of this dissertation is that the performance of 
transitional justice in Nepal, including the performance of redressing human rights violations 
experienced by victims and addressing the needs of the most vulnerable victims (e.g. children), 
functions to conceal the state’s commitment to maintaining structural inequality.  
Transitional justice models base their legitimacy in international law, primarily human 
rights law and humanitarian law. It is according to these legal norms that violations must be 
redressed and perpetrators must be brought to justice. The origins of what is now referred to as 
transitional justice traces its origins to the post-World War II establishment of international 
tribunals created to prosecute war criminals. Although international human rights laws 
addressing diverse identities and inequality have been codified, those legal documents have yet 
to be prioritized in ways that change structures of power, thus ensuring ongoing discrimination 
and extreme poverty. Although the UN treaty system now officially recognizes all rights-from 
civil and political to economic, social, and cultural- as justiciable, in most countries undergoing 
processes of transitional justice, including Nepal, the mechanisms have typically focused on 
redressing the following violations, often categorized as “gross” violations of human rights: 
murder, torture, sexual violence, forced disappearance, arbitrary arrest and abduction, forced 
displacement, and the recruitment of child soldiers.  
To come back to my interview with Udaya in 2013, my questioning of how she makes 
sense of the contradictions in her work was spurred by her detailed explanation of what would 
need to happen for Nepal to experience lasting peace. Among the themes she discussed were 
what she viewed as problematic homogenizing international development and its influence on 
the perpetuation of similarly problematic homogenizing nationalism, resulting in discrimination 
and “un-peace.” She explained, 
I think all international development frameworks that are homogenizing the world are 
problematic. Why am I forced to speak English? Because of this homogenization and 
education, thousands and thousands of languages are dying every day. When language 
dies, knowledge dies, isn't it? So we are killing something for our comfort. Because I 
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know English, you should know English. So, we actually learn how to dominate small 
minorities…but the same policy [as in India] was brought to Nepal in 1956. An American 
came from India to Nepal to decide the education policy. He decided there should only be 
one language in Nepal, but there were more than 100 languages in Nepal. There was a 
clear policy: if you don't speak Nepali, you are not Nepali. So, it was systematic 
suppression and oppression of the people. Even today, the school leaving certificate from 
the children who attend in grade 1 out of 100 only two are getting to grade 10, only two. 
And mostly those are Nepali native speakers. Why? Because the others can't sustain in 
the school. Because if you can't speak clear Nepali, how can you pass? That is the kind of 
exclusion we have done. It is not only in Nepal. It's everywhere in the world. So, we 
made a standard frame. So everyone has to fit this. I cannot change this. This policy has 
also systematically oppressed the people in Nepal particularly. I can give you many 
examples. That is the cause of violence. That is the cause of the absence of peace. If I 
say, ‘speak Nepali with me. Otherwise, I will slap you,’ your peace will go down 
immediately, isn't it? So, that is the cause of un-peace in the life of Nepali people. 
 
Attention to existing hierarchies and inequalities is particularly important in Nepal where 
the systemic political, social, and economic exclusion and stigmatization of certain groups have 
been identified as factors in the conflict (Joshi 2009; Lawoti 2010; Mani 2008; Pasipanodya 
2008; Robins 2011, 2012; Sajjad 2013; Thapa and Sijapati 2003). Nepal’s armed conflict was 
fueled by demands for the redress of social, political, and economic injustices. While statistically 
Nepal was showing an increase in economic growth and the expansion of development in the 
1990s, the “income share of the top 10 percent of people increased from 21 percent in the mid-
1980s to 35 percent by the mid-1990s, while the share of the bottom 40 percent shrank from 24 
percent to 15 percent by the mid-1990s” (Lawoti 2010; quote in Sharma 2006:1243). Thus, when 
the armed conflict began, many people were experiencing extreme poverty and vast economic 
inequality, including inequitable access to land ownership, forests, and water (Lawoti 2010). 
Large segments of the population were excluded from the benefits of development, and poverty 
levels were substantially higher in rural areas than urban areas. Significant inequalities existed 
based on caste and ethnic group membership as well. “High” caste male elites continue to 
dominate powerful positions, including the head of state, the judiciary, the legislature, academia, 
and non-governmental organizations in addition to having greater access to resources, including, 
for example, education and land (Ibid). The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist directly 
confronted these issues and demanded land redistribution, free and equitable access to education, 
healthcare, roads, drinking water, and electricity (40 demands as cited in Thapa and Sijapati 
2004: 211-218).  
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Transitional justice policies are closely related to development policies and frameworks 
based on modernization theory. Within all of these models, social and political progress are 
marked by comparing “less developed,” “Third World” countries to “developed” countries in 
“the West,” and measuring their “backwardness” or “progress” by their commitment to 
democratic norms and values, among other key indicators. This dissertation builds on the work 
of previous scholars that have critiqued transitional justice as an “industry” that obscures the 
complicity of powerful states and neoliberal policies in human rights violations, illuminated how 
global power inequities are reproduced through processes of transitional justice, and called for 
transitional justice to address inequality and structural violence through “distributive justice” and 
“transformative justice”  (e.g. Aguilar and Gómez 2011; Bergsmo, et al. 2010; Gready 2010; 
Gready and Robins 2014; Mani 2008; Ní Aoláin 2009; Robins 2011, 2012, 2013; Sundar 2004).  
Ironically, as transitional justice policy simultaneously creates and homogenizes victims 
of human rights and humanitarian law violations, it is based on an ideology of hierarchy and a 
teleology where the nation-state modernizes, becomes developed, and progresses towards a 
liberal democracy. In other words, the state is theorized as transitioning, but the people within 
the state are treated as static and homogenous. More specifically, victims are often homogenized 
in discourses on transitional justice as if their experience of a gross violation of human rights 
alone determines their needs during and after an armed conflict. Although greater attention has 
been drawn to the impact of armed conflict on children since the Convention on the Rights of 
Child came into force in 1990 (see also Graça Machel’s 1996 report highlighting the topic), how 
children’s needs change over time and how the combined experiences of being a victim and, for 
example, poor, female, “low” caste, and located in a rural village, impacts their ability to access 
processes of transitional justice, are not considered in scholarship or policy. Further, attention to 
“the local,” often opposed to “the global,” encourages nationalist policies and practices that fail 
to account for heterogeneity within national contexts. In countries undergoing processes of 
transitional justice after an internal armed conflict, a nationalist “local” is exclusionary to the 
most marginalized victims within a nation-state. Although human rights law and humanitarian 
law recognize social diversity, transitional justice policies homogenize victims, arguably as part 
of the nation-building project. Because processes of transitional justice are typically focused on 
the transition to a newly/differently governed nation-state, it is unsurprising that such processes 
fail to focus on difference, discrimination, and inequality within a state where nationalism is 
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likely prioritized to facilitate the political transition. Nationalism, as Calhoun argues, “has played 
a central role in the development of ‘essentialist’ thinking,” or reducing “diversity in a 
population to some single criterion held to constitute its defining ‘essence’ and most crucial 
character” (1995:18). Within such conceptualizations, people are thought to belong to one 
nation, one “race,” and speak one language without contemplation of the ways in which people 
understand themselves as members of different organized collectivities (i.e. families, 
communities, international organizations) and identities simultaneously, and further, it’s taken 
for granted that people’s identities can change over time (Ibid: 18-19).  
Overarching Arguments and Summaries of Chapters 
In this dissertation, I argue for an approach to transitional justice that analyzes the diverse 
and dynamic ways in which people experience armed conflict and its aftermath. I question what 
actually changes during a state’s “transitional period” and illuminate how transitional justice is 
utilized, politicized, and manipulated by powerful actors. Throughout this dissertation, I examine 
the varied experiences of people who endured gross violations of human rights as children, 
according to international law, and who are now, within that legal framework, adults. I follow 
the lives of victims of Nepal’s armed conflict as they transition out of what is recognized in 
international law as a temporary phase known as “childhood” and explore what they recognize as 
constant and temporal in their own lives as the Nepali state undergoes its own transition, also 
argued to be a temporary phase, transitional justice. By focusing on the chronological transition 
of victims’ biological age, I highlight people’s dynamic lived experiences during Nepal’s 
political transition. I inquire how diverse identities and patterned inequality are reconstituted and 
performed through processes of transitional justice and whose interests are served. I contend the 
performance of inclusion through state-led transitional justice mechanisms functions to conceal 
international complicity in as well as the state’s commitment to maintaining structural inequality 
and serves as a distraction from claims for equitable access to power and resources. 
 In the next chapter, I outline my research methodology. I conducted 14 months of 
ethnographic research in Nepal May-July 2013 and January-December 2016 primarily in two 
districts: Kathmandu and Bardiya. In addition to being the headquarters for Nepal’s national 
government, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, diplomats, and donors, the primary 
institutions responsible for implementing state-led processes of transitional justice are all located 
in Kathmandu, Nepal’s capital. Bardiya was one of the most affected districts during Nepal’s 
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armed conflict (in terms of gross violations of human rights), is primarily rural, and the majority 
of people living there are politically and economically alienated from the nation’s capital city. In 
both districts, I had conversations and conducted semi-structured as well as informal interviews 
with victims of Nepal’s armed conflict, including prominent members of victims’ organizations, 
in addition to members of Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions, Nepali government officials, 
diplomats, donors, and staff from the UN, international non-governmental organizations, and 
non-governmental organizations. Additionally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 
Nepalis who experienced a gross violation of human rights as a child, as defined in international 
law (younger than 18 years of age), in both Kathmandu and Bardiya (28 total) to analyze how 
victims understood and evaluated transitional justice mechanisms. My fieldwork also entailed 
observing eleven key events, including victims’ groups meetings, memorials, conferences, 
demonstrations regarding transitional justice, and meetings hosted at the Transitional Justice 
Resource Centre.  
Examining Nepal’s social structure and political history in Chapter Three, I discuss the 
connections of Nepal’s armed conflict to social, political, and economic exclusion. I pay 
particular attention to communist movements in South Asia, Nepal’s peace agreement, and 
transitional justice processes following the armed conflict. I argue Nepal’s history of patterned 
inequitable access to power and resources, along with the exacerbation of inequality due to 
international development aid and neoliberal policies, must be examined to analyze how 
processes of transitional justice and ongoing social, economic, and political exclusion are 
historically sedimented and continue to be contested.  
In Chapter Four, I analyze the perceptions and experiences of adults who were children 
when their fathers were killed or disappeared during the armed conflict in Nepal. I examine 
theories of children and armed conflict and challenge homogenizing, fixed conceptualizations of 
“children” and “the local” within transitional justice scholarship and practice. I argue age alone 
does not determine children’s vulnerability during armed conflict and call for the redress of 
entrenched systems of domination and inequality.  
Chapter Five draws attention to the meanings victims and their families in Bardiya, a 
rural and largely poor region of Nepal where 52% of the population is from the indigenous Tharu 
community, assigned to education and highlight their experiences of inequitable access to 
scholarships targeting “conflict affected children” as part of Nepal’s Interim Relief Program. I 
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argue that discourses of knowing/not knowing are instrumental in the concealment of power and 
the perpetuation of marginalization and inequality in Nepal. Through examining the scholarship 
provision for “conflict affected children,” I contend the barriers conflict victims in Bardiya 
experience trying to access scholarships demonstrate not only that structural inequality still exists 
during the “transitional” period but that the state is committed to maintaining it.  
I focus on Nepal’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Commission of 
Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons in Chapter Six. Through observation of and 
interviews with facilitators and victims about the “complaint-taking” processes of both 
commissions, I analyze the performance of inclusion and show how marginalized victims were 
systemically excluded from these truth-seeking processes. Despite the lack of inclusive practices 
implemented at the national level and minimal international support, Nepal’s truth-seeking 
commissions received more than 58,000 complaints. I examine the inclusion of “children” in the 
commissions’ policies, question facilitators’ understandings of “children” in the Nepali context, 
and include the diverse experiences and perceptions of the commissions by two Nepali males 
who were tortured by soldiers in the Nepal Army when they were younger than 18 years of age. 
Rather than redress the human rights violations they experienced during armed conflict, I 
maintain that by excluding victims generally, and marginalized groups specifically, processes of 
transitional justice in Nepal have entrenched inequality and distrust in the government. Within 
this context, justice, as defined by victims, remains elusive both now and in the foreseeable 
future. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Methods 
 
Research Design and The “Field” in Time and Space 
I conducted 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Nepal from May to July 2013 and 
from January to December 2016. In 2013, I conducted preliminary research in the Kathmandu 
Valley and five districts of the Mid-Western Region, including Banke, Bardiya, Dang, Surkhet, 
and Rolpa. Although I was already working to learn the Nepali language, a male research 
assistant fluent in Nepali and English traveled with me to all districts in the Mid-Western Region 
in 2013 and served as my translator during all interviews. Kathmandu, Nepal’s capital, is the 
headquarters of the primary institutions involved in the administration of transitional justice 
mechanisms at the national level. The Mid-Western Region of Nepal is considered to be the most 
affected by Nepal’s armed conflict in terms of the greatest number of casualties and enforced 
disappearances. During my preliminary research in 2013, I conducted semi-structured and 
informal interviews with people involved in processes of transitional justice in Nepal, including 
conflict victims, national and local politicians, local peace committee members, and staff from 
UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and governmental organizations. These 
interviews revealed that perceptions of effective redress regarding human rights violations 
experienced by Nepalis varied among and between the aforementioned groups; additionally, 
these interviews illuminated a common perception: that women and children were “the most 
affected” by Nepal’s conflict. I observed critical events regarding transitional justice in Nepal, 
including demonstrations by victims’ groups and “fortnightly talks” presented at the Transitional 
Justice Resource Centre in Kathmandu. In addition, I conducted archival research at the 
Transitional Justice Resource Centre and the Kathmandu School of Law examining local 
literature and other resources, including news articles, victims’ groups’ publications, and a 
conflict mapping database. My initial study allowed me to narrow my research sites to two 
districts, Kathmandu and Bardiya. Bardiya was one of the most affected districts during the 
armed conflict. The most enforced disappearances during the armed conflict occurred in Bardiya, 
and members of the indigenous Tharu community were disproportionately affected. 
When I returned to Nepal in January 2016, I initiated my research in Kathmandu. 
Everyday life was noticeably different compared to 2013 due to the fuel crisis that had been 
ongoing since Nepal’s new constitution was promulgated in September 2015. Compared to 2013, 
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taxi rates had tripled, and public transportation was slow, scarce, and uncomfortable as space on 
buses was extremely limited. Traveling from my residence in northwest Kathmandu to central 
Kathmandu by bus took an hour and a half and sometimes two hours one way. I often watched 
from the bus window as people loudly argued while waiting in line for cooking gas, which, along 
with petrol was being rationed by the Government of Nepal. The family I stayed with in 
Kathmandu was noticeably tense about the scarcity of cooking gas, petrol, food, and medicine. 
Additionally, since I left Nepal in 2013, national elections were held with the Nepali Congress 
Party (NC), a center-left party, capturing the highest number of votes and their leader, Sushil 
Koirala, becoming the prime minister in February 2014. In October 2015, the Communist Party 
of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), a moderate communist party, captured power 
and Khadga Prasad Oli was the prime minister when I returned in January 2016. From the time 
of the first post-war elections in 2008 until 2016, Nepalis witnessed eight changes of 
government. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of 
Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) had both been established, the country 
had endured a 7.8 earthquake, and a new constitution had been promulgated. 
Regarding processes of transitional justice, by January 2016, the TRC along with the 
CIEDP and the National Human Rights Commission formally requested that the Government of 
Nepal amend the Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 
2014 (TRC Act), in accordance with the 2014 Supreme Court verdict that declared amnesty 
provisions unconstitutional. Yet, the TRC Act remains unchanged since its promulgation in May 
2014. Due to the government’s refusal to amend the TRC Act, in February 2016, the UN 
formally declared their lack of support for Nepal’s truth commissions. Prominent diplomats, 
donors, international non-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations have 
also expressed their lack of support based on the amnesty provision in the TRC Act. In March 
2017, the TRC and CIEDP announced they would begin “accepting complaints” from victims in 
mid-April. Although initially limited to 60 days, the commissions extended the acceptance of 
complaints to 90 days total. 
After the commissions began accepting complaints, I decided to conduct research in both 
districts throughout my 12 months of fieldwork allowing me to maintain contacts and attend 
events in Kathmandu and Bardiya. By December 2016, I had traveled to Bardiya from 
Kathmandu and back four times.  Traveling between field sites allowed me to observe 
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complaint-taking processes, victims’ organizations’ meetings, demonstrations, and conferences 
in both districts. In addition, by May 2016, I had developed relationships with victims and 
transitional justice facilitators in both districts. In Kathmandu, I observed demonstrations 
regarding transitional justice in front of national government offices, utilized libraries for 
archival research, and maintained contact with government officials and non-governmental 
organizations involved in transitional justice advocacy or policy implementation and with 
members of national conflict victims’ organizations based in the capital. In Bardiya, I conducted 
research in multiple rural villages and in Gulariya, the district headquarters. For the safety of my 
informants, I have not included the names of the villages where I conducted research. Bardiya 
District is located in the Terai (the lowland region of southern Nepal), borders India, and is 
primarily rural and agricultural.  
 In May 2013, I initiated formal language training in Nepal. Over the summer of 2015, I 
attended the Summer Intensive Nepali Language Program at Cornell University and continued 
my language training in Nepal during my fieldwork in 2016. Interviewees were given the option 
of speaking the language of their choice. Thus, I conducted interviews in English, Nepali, and 
Tharu or some combination thereof. My research assistants served as translators for interviews 
conducted primarily in Tharu and/or Nepali. My primary research assistant was Pooja 
Chaudhary. Ms. Chaudhary is fluent in Tharu, Nepali, and English and translated during 
interviews in Kathmandu and Bardiya. Because she was pursuing her law degree, I worked with 
three additional research assistants when Pooja was unavailable. In Bardiya, I worked with a 
male research assistant, Ajit Dahit, fluent in Tharu, Nepali, and English who was pursuing a 
degree in Microbiology. My male (Ajit Dahit) and female (Pooja Chaudhary) research assistants 
in Bardiya were both members of the Tharu community. In Kathmandu, I worked with two 
female research assistants, Bandana Aswasthi and Asmita Poudel, who were both fluent in 
English and Nepali. Asmita Poudel was pursuing a degree in Conflict, Peace and Development 
Studies and working at a non-governmental organization as a Gender and Transitional Justice 
Officer. Bandana Aswathi was a graduate student pursuing a degree in Anthropology. All the 
aforementioned research assistants resided primarily in Kathmandu and served as translators 
during interviews. 
In addition to providing translation, all of my research assistants offered their own 
insights into my research. After interviews, I had conversations with research assistants about 
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their reflections, asked questions for clarity, and sought their perceptions of my insights and 
ongoing analyses. They also provided valuable practical advice in terms of appropriate phrasing 
of interview questions and etiquette before, during, and after interviews. When interviewees 
invited us into their homes, I frequently looked to my research assistants for guidance on 
appropriate behavior and phrasing of words. Pooja Chaudhary, in particular, guided my words 
and actions in ways that helped me to develop respectful relationships with informants in 
Kathmandu and Bardiya. At times during my research, I lived with and shared food with Pooja’s 
and Ajit’s families. I referred to Pooja as my younger sister and Ajit as my younger brother. 
Although I did not live with their families or refer to them with familial terms, Asmita and 
Bandana were incredibly friendly to me and supportive of my research. I am grateful for the 
relationships I developed with all of my research assistants. Their guidance and support were 
fundamental to my being able to conduct my dissertation research. 
 The following questions and objectives guided my research. First, how did children 
experience the armed conflict relative to their position in Nepali society? To examine this 
question, I conducted analyses of conflict reports issued by the United Nations, international 
non-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The examination of 
factors shaping their experiences was based on my analysis of historical patterns of 
marginalization and discrimination in Nepal, my experience in the field, and victims’ perceptions 
of their own position in Nepali society as revealed through ethnographic interviews. Secondly, I 
questioned how Nepalis who experienced gross violations of human rights as children viewed 
the effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms. Relatedly, I wanted to know how 
differences in social distinctions, such as gender, age, caste, ethnic group, political and religious 
affiliation, access to resources, and region of residence shaped their ability to access transitional 
justice mechanisms. Finally, I sought out the perspectives of Nepalis who experienced gross 
violations of human rights as children on the Nepali government, justice, reconciliation, the 
ongoing peace process, and other political dynamics in Nepal.  
 These initial research questions led to additional inquiries during the course of my research 
and analysis. I began to critically investigate how structural inequality was reconstituted through 
transitional justice, and relatedly, who had the authority to implement transitional justice policies 
and why. I also wanted to understand what I saw as the performance of inclusion through 
transitional justice and what political work was being accomplished through the façade of 
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inclusion. I utilized ethnographic methods, including semi-structured and informal interviews, 
conversations, participant observation, observation, and archival research. 
 My fieldwork entailed observing eleven key events, including victims’ groups meetings, 
memorials, conferences, demonstrations regarding transitional justice, and meetings hosted at the 
Transitional Justice Resource Centre. I conducted semi-structured and informal interviews and 
had conversations with victims of Nepal’s armed conflict, including prominent members of 
victims’ organizations, as well as members of Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions, Nepali 
government officials, diplomats, donors, and staff from the UN, international non-governmental 
organizations, and non-governmental organizations.  
Additionally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 Nepalis who experienced a 
gross violation of human rights as a child (as defined in international law-younger than 18 years 
of age), who had since transitioned into adulthood (within international law-18 years of age or 
older) in both Kathmandu and Bardiya (28 total) to analyze how victims understood and 
evaluated transitional justice mechanisms. Further, people who were affected by conflict as 
children from different castes, ethnic groups, genders, religious and political affiliations and with 
varying access to resources were interviewed in both districts allowing a comparison of their 
experiences of conflict and the “transitional” period. Victims’ ongoing social and life-cycle 
transitions are frequently disregarded, and this dissertation contributes to transitional justice 
scholarship and practice through emphasizing the significance of victims’ dynamic and varied 
lived experiences. Interviewees were identified through conversations with prominent members 
of victims’ organizations as well as village leaders and snowball sampling. During the course of 
some interviews, interviewees revealed that they had not experienced what would be considered 
a gross violation of human rights within international law. Although those interviews are not 
counted in the 28 total listed above, they were all transcribed and analyzed. My analysis of 
interviews with people who were affected by armed conflict as children (younger than 18 years 
of age) but did not, according to international law, experience a gross violation of human rights 
also contributed to the arguments in this dissertation. Interviews focused on perceptions of (1) 
justice and reconciliation regarding the human rights violation(s) they experienced during the 
armed conflict and the ongoing peace process in Nepal, (2) “effective” redress of the violation(s), 
(3) existing transitional justice mechanisms, specifically truth-seeking commissions and the 
Interim Relief Program, and (4) the Nepali government. All interviewees were asked to self-
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identify their demographic data and interviews were coded by age, gender, caste, ethnic group, 
marital status, access to resources, region of residence, education, occupation, religious 
affiliation, and political affiliation. Although most of these codes were discussed over the course 
of the interview, I created a personal data sheet to ensure all interviews were coded as 
consistently as possible. Following every interview, interviewees were given a form to complete 
asking their (1) age, (2) gender, (3) marital status, (4) number of children, (5) current/natal 
region of residence, (6) religious affiliation, (7) political party affiliation, (8) group membership, 
(9) caste/ethnic group, and (10) the highest level of education completed by themselves, their 
children, and their parents. Regarding access to resources, the personal data sheet listed questions 
about their and their families’ (1) occupation, (2) ownership of house, land, and livestock2, (3) 
income, and (4) economic struggles. My research assistant offered to assist interviewees as they 
were completing their personal data sheet. 
 In international human rights and humanitarian law, “children” are codified uniformly 
according to biological age. However, conceptualizations of children in Nepal are diverse and 
the perceived transition into adulthood is more complex than reaching a certain biological age. 
Scholars have illuminated how, in Nepal, transitions into adulthood are marked by getting a job, 
becoming physically developed, and understanding appropriate behavior (Kohrt and Maharian 
2009). When I asked their age, many of my interviewees paused. After some thought, all of my 
interviewees were able to respond to questions regarding their current age and date of birth. Yet, 
several interviewees asked if I wanted their real age or their age according to their citizenship. In 
Nepal, births are not typically registered with the government. At the age of 16, Nepalis are 
eligible to go to their local government office and register as citizens. At that time, their date of 
birth is registered as part of the process. For some of my interviewees, they registered their date 
of birth as earlier, making their officially recognized age older, typically with the hopes of 
securing employment in sectors with an age bar. Because transitional justice aims to redress 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, I focus on Nepalis who were 
children according to international law (younger than the age of 18) when they experienced a 
gross violation of human rights. I asked interviewees for their accurate date of birth to determine 
																																																								
2 See, for example, pages 29-31 in this dissertation on how inequitable access to land was 
significant in Nepal’s armed conflict. Owning livestock can be a marker of a family’s livelihood 
and access to food, particularly in Bardiya, which is primarily an agricultural district. 
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if they were younger than 18 years of age during the armed conflict. All interviewees self-
identified as either male or female, and, in both Kathmandu and Bardiya, I interviewed seven (14 
total) males and seven (14 total) females. 
  In Nepali, “jat” is often used without distinction to denote what in English is categorized 
separately as “caste” and “ethnic group.” However, since the 1990s, the term “janajati” has 
become more popular in Nepali to describe what in English might be termed “ethnic group” as 
well as the phrase “adivasi janajati” translated to English as “indigenous nationality” or 
“indigenous ethnic group” (Gellner 2007; Shneiderman 2013). Gellner (2007) traces this 
distinction and the Nepali neologism to Indian origins, coming into Nepali from Bengali, via 
Darjeeling, and argues the distinction of “janajati” is similar to the distinction between caste and 
tribe in India. The timing of this distinction is correlated with the end of a period in Nepal known 
as the Panchayat era, during which Nepalis were encouraged to portray themselves as 
homogenous (though not equal). The Panchayat era ended in 1990 with an uprising known as 
“The People’s Movement” (jana andolan) leading to a new constitution that declared Nepal was 
a “multiethnic,” “multilingual,” “Hindu,” democracy. Subsequently, membership in a janajati 
group was viewed by some as a political advantage in a country where high caste Hindu men 
dominated every aspect of politics (Ibid). Issues surrounding the ongoing marginalization of 
people from “low” caste and janajati groups have remained contentious after the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement marking the cessation of Nepal’s armed conflict in 2006. For 
example, contention over the 2015 constitution, over which the fuel crisis occurred, was due to 
the continued political exclusion of historically marginalized groups as exemplified through the 
determination of Nepal’s newly demarcated federal provinces.  
 In Nepal, everyone is aware of their “jat,” which has important implications in everyday life 
often determining their access to resources and representation in government. Surnames are 
typically a marker by which “jat” is revealed. Asking someone which caste group they belong to 
can be offensive, particularly for marginalized groups. Oftentimes, people’s last names do mark 
their membership in a particular group. Yet, it was important for my research to understand my 
interviewees’ perceptions of their membership in a particular group and how it affected their 
everyday lives, experiences of armed conflict, and access to mechanisms of transitional justice. 
Interviewees often brought up their “jat” during the interview. They were asked to clarify not 
only others’ perceptions of their “jat” but also their understanding of the concept while 
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completing the personal data sheet. I administered the personal data sheet at the end of each 
interview first explaining why it was important for my research to gather data on sensitive 
personal questions and assuring them their name would not be associated with the information 
they provided. I interviewed Nepalis affected by armed conflict as children from multiple “jats” 
in Kathmandu and Bardiya, including people who identified as Brahmin, Chettri, Gurung, 
Magar, Madheshi, Tamang, and Tharu. In this dissertation, I primarily focus on the experiences 
and perceptions of members of the Tharu community.  
  Interviewees’ and their family members’ occupations, annual income, as well as land, 
livestock, and house ownership determined “access to resources” as a code. The interviewees’ 
and their family members’ level of education, and if they attended private or public school were 
also considered in “access to resources,” but were coded separately. On the personal data sheet, I 
asked interviewees if they struggled to buy anything on a regular basis. As with “jat,” 
interviewees’ access to resources was discussed over the course of the interview in addition to 
the questions asked in the personal data sheet. While questions regarding religious affiliation 
were answered, albeit typically briefly and without hesitation, some interviewees preferred not to 
initially disclose their political affiliations. There was a distinction made by interviewees 
between membership in a political party and their perceptions of one political party being more 
representative of the issues they valued. Over the course of the interview, or in subsequent 
conversations or observations, their political views were revealed, and often their political 
affiliation or membership. For many interviewees, this meant their continued refusal to affiliate 
with or support any political party, and for others, their tentative support offered to one party 
they considered only slightly better than any other political party. Yet, some interviewees 
unabashedly proclaimed their support for and affiliation with a particular political party. 
 Interviewees were chosen based on purposive and snowball sampling techniques. In 
purposive sampling, informants are chosen based on their experiences regarding the research 
topic (Bernard 2011). In snowball sampling, informants are chosen based on recommended lists 
from previous informants. Key informants that I met in 2013 aided in snowball sampling. 
Purposive sampling and subsequent snowball sampling were extremely productive sampling 
techniques to engage with members of the international community, domestic facilitators of 
transitional justice, and victims. I gained initial entry into the Kathmandu-based transitional 
justice arena, meaning meeting people involved in victims’ organizations, staff from UN 
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organizations, international non-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
academics, and politicians during my preliminary fieldwork in 2013. When I visited the 
Transitional Justice Resource Centre in 2013, I met the director, who was an anthropologist. He 
personally invited me to programs hosted at the Centre and suggested people for me to interview. 
When I struggled to establish a connection with someone, he called them on my behalf or went 
with me to the initial meeting (suggesting it would later be easier to schedule an interview after I 
had established contact in person). I also developed some of these relationships via email and 
video conferencing from the United States until returning to Nepal in 2016. The connections I 
developed by meeting, having conversations with, and interviewing people involved in 
transitional justice during my preliminary fieldwork aided my access to interviewees in 2016. 
 During my preliminary research outside of the Kathmandu Valley, I established some 
connections with members of victims’ organizations and non-governmental organizations that 
were developed further in 2016. However, relationships with most of my interviewees and 
informants in Bardiya were initiated during my fieldwork in 2016. To gain access in Bardiya, I 
sometimes relied on my informants in Kathmandu to provide contact information and establish 
contact on my behalf. In some government offices, I just showed up and, in others, I was able to 
arrange a meeting before arriving. 
 Primary documents, such as press releases issued by victims’ groups and reports by the UN, 
international non-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations, were 
analyzed, and fieldnotes were taken throughout the research. Fieldnotes included details about 
the place, space, and circumstances of my observations, interviews, and conversations (Emerson, 
et. al 2011). I recorded interviewees’ and my own verbal and non-verbal responses, interviewees’ 
perceptions, and notes about our interactions and their interactions with others. I also took jot 
notes during interviews, observation, and, at times, during conversations and participant 
observation, and I utilized the jot notes to later to write full fieldnotes (Ibid). I primarily recorded 
notes, and my research assistants sometimes aided in note taking. 
I initiated data reduction and analysis in the field and throughout my data collection and 
writing (Dewalt and Dewalt 2002; Emerson, et al. 2011 Dewalt and Dewalt 2002; Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Miles and Huberman 1994; Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1998). I entered fieldnotes, 
primary documents, and transcribed interviews into Nvivo (qualitative data analysis software). I 
then analyzed the data using inductive and deductive coding to identify patterns and themes. 
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During analysis, I wrote theoretical memos to document applicable theoretical concepts related 
to the data being analyzed, and I took integrative memos to clarify and link analytic themes and 
categories (Emerson, et al. 2011). 
Informed Consent and Safety Concerns 
The safety of my informants was a primary concern during my fieldwork. All 
interviewees were informed in writing and verbally the purpose of the interview, their 
participation was entirely voluntary, and they could stop participating at any time. Interviewees 
were encouraged to share their experiences and perceptions only as they were comfortable. All 
interviewees were made aware that I was a Ph.D. student from the United States of America 
conducting my dissertation research in Nepal.  
Interviews were conducted with people affected by conflict as children with the 
agreement that I would not include identifying information about them in any of my 
publications. Further, I explained that I was not associated with the UN or any organization, that 
I was writing a book and would like to include their stories and perceptions, and that I otherwise 
was unsure what would happen as a result of my research. I said that I hoped to return but it was 
possible this would be our only meeting. Interviewees were informed that their participation 
would not directly result in them receiving any humanitarian aid or other compensation. I also 
explained that I took an applied approach to my work and hoped that my research would 
positively affect their lives. Yet, the only result I could reasonably assure them of was the 
publication of my research. Interviews were conducted in private as per the preferences of the 
interviewees. All interviewees were asked to choose if they preferred to be alone during the 
interview or in the presence of their family members and/or friends. Most interviewees preferred 
to be alone during the interview while others preferred the presence of one or more of their 
family members (usually their mother) or a friend. During data collection and analysis, efforts 
were made to ensure the confidentiality of respondents. After their interviews, all interviewees 
were assigned a number and their names removed from their interview transcripts. All data 
collected through fieldnotes with potentially identifying information was carried with me until it 
was destroyed in the field during ongoing data reduction and analysis. 
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Chapter 33 
Historically Sedimented Inequality and Exclusion 
 
This kind of structure is not created in a day. We're talking about the existing structure 
and the effects of conflict and intervention while addressing that. If we look at the 
intervention by the government in the form of the Interim Relief Program, there is no 
visible discrimination at a face value. However, there is discrimination. For example, 
torture victims and victims of rape and sexual violence are excluded…Based on gender, 
in the scholarship [provision], there is no discrimination at face value by the government. 
It is not said that okay only the girl child will get the scholarship or only the boy child 
will get the scholarship. But the structure is that there is a kind of defacto discrimination 
that takes place. In many places during the [distribution of] the Interim Relief Program, 
many people didn’t have access to information about what kind of documents they 
needed. In many places, their marriage was not registered. So, the state officials were 
asking for documents that they didn’t have. Customarily and still many people who get 
married have not registered. There is no practice of registering birth also. There is a kind 
of discrimination compared to the people in the urban areas who have that kind of legal 
registration. The people in the villages are discriminated against by the existing structure. 
There is a kind of discrimination in the Interim Relief Program. So, those kinds of 
practices are there. 
 
I was having tea with Kavi who was working for a Kathmandu-based international non-
governmental organization as he explained to me that the discriminatory practices associated 
with processes of transitional justice in Nepal were connected to historically sedimented 
structures. Significantly, he highlights how, within transitional justice policy, the discriminatory 
aspects may not be apparent to those unfamiliar with Nepal’s context. In this chapter, I highlight 
the contestation and reiteration of historically sedimented power relations in Nepal. I argue 
Nepal’s history of patterned inequitable access to power and resources, along with the 
exacerbation of inequality due to international development aid and neoliberal policies, must be 
examined to analyze how processes of transitional justice and ongoing social, economic, and 
political exclusion are historically sedimented and continue to be contested.  
Since the inception of the Nepali state, males from certain caste groups have been 
politically and economically dominant (Whelpton 2005). As Guneratne (2002:72) argues, “from 
the perspective of interethnic relations in Nepal, what is salient is that the landowning nobility, 
the bureaucracy, and the higher ranks of the military were all drawn from the dominant Brahmin, 
Chhetri, and Thakuri castes of the hills.” In 1768, Prithvi Narayan Shah unified Nepal after 																																																								
3 Excerpts of this chapter are taken directly from Billingsley (2018). 
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conquering various independent kingdoms and principalities, moved the capital to Kathmandu, 
and established the Shah dynasty. Through the Shah dynasty, succession of power was passed 
down based on the divine right of kings. 
Following an organized massacre of political leaders and takeover of power, in 1846, 
Jang Bahadur Rana initiated the Rana regime, which demoted the Shah King to a figure head, 
established a system of hereditary prime ministers, and perpetuated the marginalization of “low” 
caste groups. For example, in 1854, Rana enacted the Muluki Ain. This code of law divided 
people into a caste system based on five basic categories: “wearers of the sacred thread,” “non-
enslavable alcohol drinkers,” “enslavable alcohol drinkers,” “impure but touchable castes,” and 
“impure but untouchable castes” (Höfer 1979). The categories were hierarchically ranked, and 
the law included stipulations on socially acceptable practices, such as food taboos and the 
prohibition of marriage between groups and adopting another group’s traditional professions 
(Ibid).  While these legal norms map onto sociocultural experience in complex ways and the 
categories are fluid and contested through social practice, the Nepali state explicitly sanctioned 
social hierarchies and codified discrimination. Further, the Nepali language and Hindu religious 
practices were not only encouraged, but also legally endorsed by the state (Whelpton 1997). 
These practices legitimized elite dominance and power and have continued despite political and 
social changes in Nepal. Through each political change, ideas about the inherent inequality 
between and among groups of people in Nepal have been encouraged and utilized to ensure the 
power of some and the exclusion of others.  
In 1951, with the support of the Indian government, Nepalis educated abroad, many of whom 
were involved in the Indian independence movement, started a successful political movement 
against the ruling Ranas. Talks were initiated to establish a constitution with a representative 
form of government, and the Shah king, King Tribhuvan, called for the establishment of a multi-
party democracy and the election of a Constituent Assembly. Despite numerous changes in 
political power, Nepalis outside of dominant groups have continued to experience widespread 
political exclusion and economic inequality. Political power and wealth are concentrated in 
Kathmandu, and people living outside Nepal’s capital city have been consistently ignored by 
those in power and excluded from access to resources. Further, since it’s inception, kings 
residing in Kathmandu have demanded shares of resources and enforced systems of feudalism 
throughout the country.  
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In Nepal, diverse identities among those who reside within state boundaries has been 
emphasized, reiterated, and contested through law, the rhetoric of political leaders, and in 
national ceremonies. As Calhoun (1997) has argued, nationalism demands conformity. During 
the Panchayat era in Nepal, from 1960-1990, Nepal was officially declared a Hindu Kingdom, 
caste hierarchy was reinforced by the state, and attempts were made to induce conformity within 
the nation through promoting homogeneous nationalism that ignored any form of cultural 
difference. State leaders promoted the slogan “ek bhasa, ek dharma, ek bhes, ek desh” (one 
language, one religion, one form of dress, one country). National holidays often included 
performances that symbolized the union of the state with Hinduism (e.g. political leaders riding 
in chariots with Hindu priests), and, before the fall of the monarchy in 2006, the king was 
revered as an incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu.  
Simultaneously, while political leaders were reiterating the nation’s homogeneity, they were 
entrenching a hierarchy where “high” caste Hindu males from the hill region were placed in the 
most powerful positions in Kathmandu and throughout Nepal. For people or communities who 
did not conform or were marked as different, their Nepaliness, along with their value and notion 
of belonging to the state, were questioned. Thus, even as the Nepali state promoted homogeneity 
within a heterogeneous nation, it enforced a hierarchy that privileged “high” caste Hindu males 
and marginalized the majority of people living within its boundaries. Despite the historical and 
ongoing systemic state suppression of people in Nepal who spoke languages other than Nepali, 
practiced religions other than Hinduism, and claimed an identity other than that prescribed 
through Nepali nationalism, the most recent national census (2011) lists 125 caste and ethnic 
groups, 123 languages, and six religions.  
Political spaces opened in the 1990s as a result of Jana Andolen I (The People’s Movement), 
during which historically marginalized groups mobilized en masse, and, as a result, a multi-party 
democracy with a constitutional monarch was established. This allowed space for multiple 
groups, particularly ethnic and “low” caste groups, to organize for rights and representation, and 
Nepal was declared a multiethnic and multilingual state. While the 1990s are recognized as the 
time when marginalized groups organized against the dominant order, indigenous groups overtly 
and subtly contested their exclusion through rebellions and cultural preservation organizations 
during the Rana and Panchayat periods (Caplan 1970; Hangen and Lawoti 2013; Sagant 1996).  
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In addition, Dalit (“low” caste within the Hindu caste hierarchy),4 Madheshi,5 and Muslim 
organizations seized their first opportunity to publically organize in the 1950s when Nepal was 
first established as a democracy, but were repressed by the national government (Hangen 2009; 
Hangen and Lawoti 2013; Thapa 2012). However, with more political space for dissention, 
ethnic parties, non-governmental organizations, cultural associations, and identity movements 
expanded greatly in the 1990s (Gellner, et al. 1997; Hangen 2007; Hangen and Lawoti 2013; Jha 
1993; Lawoti 2005; Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999). As the 1990 constitution was being drafted, the 
marginalization of certain ethnic, regional, linguistic, and religious identities became contested 
political issues. Yet, “high” caste Hindu elites dominated the constitution-drafting process, 
ignored the demands of marginalized groups, and promoted traditional Hindu nationalism 
(Lawoti 2007; Lawoti and Hangen 2013). Thus, marginalized groups in Nepal, despite 
organizing for greater recognition and rights by the state, remained excluded and dissatisfied 
with the 1990 Constitution (Bhattachan 2013). It was within this context that the Maoists built 
their movement, and Nepal’s internal armed conflict erupted in 1996. 
The Communist Movement in South Asia 
The beginning of the communist movement in Nepal can be traced to 1949 when the 
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was established in Calcutta with the aid of Indian communists 
(Lawoti 2010:5). The party grew in the 1950s, but secured only four out of 109 seats in the first 
election to Parliament in 1959 (Ibid). During the Panchayat era (1960-1990) when political 
parties were banned in Nepal, the communist movement spread discretely even as communist 
parties were factionalized internally and suppressed by state power and politics. Influenced by 
																																																								
4 The term “Dalit” is utilized as a self-reference and often refers to a political identity in South 
Asia for people who are outside of the traditional four-caste system. Stigmatized as impure and 
polluting and, thus, physically, economically, politically, and socially excluded, Dalits are also 
disparagingly referred to as “untouchables.” 
5 Although commonly utilized as a term to describe a group of people living on Nepal’s southern 
border with India, the definition of “Madheshi” is contested. While political leaders representing 
Madheshis in Nepal continually attest to their “Nepaliness,” dominant discourses often 
categorize Madheshis as originating from and belonging to India (and thus undeserving of Nepali 
citizenship or resources). After Nepal’s armed conflict, Madheshi political movements have 
demanded a federal state for Madheshis and proportional representation as the people from this 
group have continually been excluded from political and economic resources.  
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the Naxalbari Uprising in India,6 in 1971, Nepali Communists also ignited a violent movement, 
which, as in India, was brutally suppressed by the state. In 1978, this group became the 
Communist Party of Nepal-Marxist Leninist (CPN-ML), and in 1990, CPN-ML merged with 
CPN-Marxist to form the CPN-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and became a major 
political party (Ibid).  
The emergence of Maoism in Nepal is linked to the establishment of the CPN-Fourth 
Congress in 1974, which after a number of splits became the CPN-Unity Center (CPN-UC), the 
CPN-Mashal led by Puspa Kamal Dahal (“Prachanda”), and a breakaway faction of CPN-Mashal 
led by Baburam Bhattarai (Lawoti 2010:6). The United People’s Front Nepal (UPFN) led by 
Bhattarai was created by the CPN-UC to participate in elections, and then CPN-UC and UPFN 
split before the 1994 mid-term elections (Ibid). In 1995, the CPN-UC, under the leadership of 
“Prachanda,” was renamed the CPN-Maoist and initiated plans to start an armed conflict (Ibid:7). 
In February 1996, the Bhattarai-led UPFN submitted a list of 40 demands to the Nepali 
government outlining an ultimatum: “immediately initiate steps to fulfill these demands”… or 
“we will be forced to adopt the path of armed struggle against the existing state power” (40 
demands as cited in Thapa with Sijapati 2004:215-216).  
The leaders of the Maoist movements in both India and Nepal, despite their own 
positionality as highly educated and more privileged than “low” caste peasants, identified caste 
and ethnicity, along with issues of feudalism and land, as key issues to be addressed. The 
military tactics employed in both movements, in India beginning in the 1960s and, in Nepal in 
the 1990s, focused on increasing the power of the rural poor to establish strongholds and then 
take control of cities.  
In both countries, the movements regained traction after increasing policies of economic 
liberalization. Nepal’s 10-year internal armed conflict ignited in February 1996 just days after 
Bhattarai sent a list of 40 demands to the government of Nepal, calling for, among other 
demands, an end to the domination of foreign capital and stated the “invasion of colonial and 
imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped” (40 demands as cited in 
Thapa with Sijapati 2004: 213). As Leve (2007: 128) argues,  
																																																								
6 In 1967, a violent uprising occurred in Naxalbari village in West Bengal during which peasants 
attacked local landlords, seized land, cancelled debts, and burned records. The uprising led to a 
larger movement, which spread rapidly, and inspired Maoist movements in both India and Nepal.  
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Despite the fact that millions of dollars had been devoted to rural development, the 
uneven distribution of aid benefits and political voice between urban centres and rural 
hinderlands, between rural districts, and between classes of rural and urban people 
themselves was recognized as a development failure and threat to the state. 
 
While international aid and non-governmental organizations proliferated in Nepal before the 
armed conflict, foreign aid did not ameliorate rural poverty. Rather, the economic divide between 
those who benefited from development aid, primarily in Kathmandu, and people living in 
extreme poverty in rural areas, only increased, as development aid and its benefits were most 
accessible to elite, educated, urban residents. Donors and development organizations primarily 
operate out of Kathmandu, and before the armed conflict, failed to prioritize the structural 
changes that would have benefited marginalized and poor populations living in rural areas. 
Further, donors, including the World Bank, advocated for the decentralization of education in the 
1980s. Private schools subsequently proliferated in the 1990s (NESAC 1998:87 as cited in 
Caddell 2006), which ensured increasing economic disparities between the poorest, rural 
residents and people living in the capital with greater access to financial resources.  
During the armed conflict in Nepal, Maoists destroyed loan documents, redistributed land 
to the landless, and initiated development projects, such as small-scale industrial enterprises 
(Thapa with Sijapati 2004). Additionally, Maoists distributed food at low prices to families in 
need and encouraged inter-caste marriages. Taboos against widows and menstruating women 
were revoked and gambling, alcohol, and superstitious religious practices were banned. Further, 
private schools were shut down and teacher absenteeism ceased to be problematic in Maoist 
strongholds (Ibid).  
In both India and Nepal, particularly post 9/11, Maoists have been labeled “terrorists” by 
the state enabling brutal state violence against civilians and combatants alike. While Nepal’s 
Maoist movement is commonly conceptualized in terms of civil war or an internal armed 
conflict, India’s Maoist movement is called an “uprising” or conceptualized as an eruption of 
violence. Drexler (2010) argues the language of “civil war” prevents justice within transitional 
justice contexts, because it obscures state violence and the complicity of powerful international 
forces. Calling an armed conflict a “civil war” attempts to “localize” the violence within a 
horizontal conceptualization by positing the conflict as between warring groups within a country 
rather than between a state and its citizens (Ibid). Further, the language of “civil war” obfuscates 
the complicity of powerful nations, and in Nepal, the increase in gross violations of human rights 
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following an influx of international aid to “combat terrorism.” For example, in Nepal, the United 
States (U.S.), India, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) supplied financial and logistical support to 
the Nepal government to fight the Maoists despite documented human rights violations by state 
security forces against civilians throughout the armed conflict. In this dissertation, I refer to the 
“internal armed conflict” or “armed conflict” rather than utilize the phrase “civil war” to describe 
the political violence in Nepal from 1996 until 2006. Scholars have drawn attention to how the 
ways in which political violence is framed can determine its legitimacy and conceal state terror 
and power inequities (e.g. Aretxaga 2001; Sluka 1999; Zulaika and Douglass 1996). As Sundar 
(2004) argues, “in the formation of the violent subject, the discourse of terrorism plays a central 
role in the Othering process by highlighting the culpability of the victims and downplaying other 
factors” (152). 
Within these contexts, the ways in which identities, inequality, and exclusion are framed 
by the state and by Maoist leaders in India and Nepal have determined which people experienced 
gross violations of human rights. In both countries, Maoist leaders argued they were fighting for 
peasants and people belonging to historically marginalized caste and ethnic groups. In turn, state 
violence targeted those populations regardless of their sympathies or alignments with Maoist 
party leaders or combatants. In India, the state created, armed, and trained people for Salwa 
Judum, or “the purification hunt,” which burned villages, raped women, murdered civilians, and 
established holding camps in the name of fighting Maoist terrorists (Sundar 2016).  
In Nepal, the government’s framing of Maoists as “terrorists” helped to garner 
international support for state-led violence and military aggression that was typically directed 
towards the most marginalized civilians. Significantly, the enactment of anti-terrorist legislation 
in November 2001 and subsequent financial and logistical support from the U.S., U.K., and India 
to “combat terrorists” coincides with the increase of state terror, especially enforced 
disappearances, in Bardiya (Human Rights Watch 2004; OHCHR Report 2012). Members of the 
Tharu community were disproportionately targeted by state violence and assumed, based on their 
ethnicity, to be “terrorists.” Further, the Government of Nepal announced cash rewards for the 
delivery of leaders of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, likely inspiring an escalation in 
state violence as people were increasingly tortured by state security forces for information 
(personal interviews). Subsequently, in Bardiya, as in other parts of the country, civilians were 
taken from their homes, tortured, raped, killed, and disappeared by state forces (OHCHR Report 
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2012). In the 2008 report, the OHCHR investigated 156 of the 200 reported cases of enforced 
disappearances in Bardiya district, of which 14 were attributed to the Communist Party of Nepal-
Maoist. State security forces were found responsible for the remainder of enforced 
disappearances. Both in the proliferation of enforced disappearances in Bardiya by state security 
forces and the violence enacted through Salwa Judum in India, they targeted civilians assumed to 
be aligned with the Maoists based on their ethnicity. 
However, Nepalis who supported the Maoists cannot easily be homogenized (Shah and 
Pettigrew 2012), and the lived experience of conflict in Nepal was affected by numerous factors, 
including the geographic location in which people found themselves, their age, caste or ethnic 
group, gender, access to resources, political affiliation and their family’s historical ties and 
relationships. Further, hierarchical expectations of social relations stratified by age, gender and 
caste were transformed by Nepal’s conflict (Pettigrew 2001; Shah and Pettigrew 2012; 
Shneiderman and Pettigrew 2004). For example, the Maoists encouraged the practice of 
intercaste marriage, and Maoist cadres from the Dalit community entered “high”-caste 
households, led fighting units and eschewed traditional restrictions regarding the sharing of food 
and water (Gayer 2013). Yet, Pettigrew (2013) notes how during the armed conflict some 
villagers in a Tamu-mai village in Nepal perceived the entry of people from the Dalit community 
into their homes as a serious violation of caste norms and considered the practice the cause of 
unfortunate events.  
Moreover, gender norms were simultaneously challenged and reinforced through the 
Maoist insurgency (Leve 2013; Parvati 2003a; Parvati 2003b; Shneiderman and Pettigrew 2004). 
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist demanded, “patriarchal exploitation and discrimination 
against women should be stopped” (40 demands as cited in Thapa and Sijapati 2004: 211). 
Females served in leadership positions in the Maoist hierarchy, as section commanders and vice 
commanders, and in all-female platoons (Parvati 2003a). However, regarding women’s 
leadership in the Maoists, Comrade Parvati, the Central Committee Member and Head of the 
Women’s Department of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, argued that male cadres resisted 
surrendering “the privileged position bestowed on them by the patriarchal structure” (Parvati 
2003a as cited in Shneiderman and Pettigrew 2004). Likewise, Pettigrew draws attention to how 
Maoist cadres’ demands to stay in the homes of female villagers placed women in disempowered 
positions (Pettigrew 2013). Further, conceptualizations of women’s empowerment by the 
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Maoists are rooted in homogenizing rhetoric that does not accurately define all Nepali women, 
particularly those outside of politically and economically dominant groups (Shneiderman and 
Pettigrew 2004; Tamang 2002).  
Additionally, the Maoists called for an end to inequality perpetuated through existing 
power structures and an end to feudalism as perpetuated by the Nepali state. Maoist leaders 
argued, “land should belong to tenants” and “land under the control of the feudal system should 
be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless” (40 demands as cited in Thapa 
with Sijapati 2004: 211). In Bardiya district, one of only two districts in Nepal where a majority 
of the population identifies as Tharu, many conflict victims viewed the armed conflict as a 
continuation of the struggle over land (Robins 2012). Additionally, many victims perceived 
soldiers in the Nepal Army to be enforcers of the power arrangements that left the majority of 
people from the indigenous Tharu community without access to resources, especially land, or 
political representation (Ibid). Guneratne, based on his longitudinal research in Nepal, draws 
attention to the dynamism of Tharu identity and the heterogeneity, specifically regarding access 
to power and resources, language and religion, among people who identify as Tharu (Guneratne 
2002). Yet, he indicates that Tharu identity is intimately tied to a shared history of 
discrimination, exclusion and, as a result of national and international policies, the loss of land 
(Ibid). Nepal is divided geographically by the Terai (plains along the southern border with India), 
hills in the center, and mountains along Nepal’s northern border. The Terai, where Bardiya 
district is located, is rich in natural resources, and elite members of the Tharu community utilized 
the regions’ resources to build relationships with powerful leaders in the capital. 
In the 1950s, with the encouragement of the leaders of the Nepali government and funded 
by international aid, the Malaria Eradication Program was implemented in the Terai. Following 
this program, “high”-caste Nepalis from the hills were encouraged by the state to move into the 
Terai, which ultimately resulted in the loss of land for members of the Tharu community 
(Guneratne 2002). Some “high” caste migrants exploited the existing kamaiya labor system, 
resulting in extended bonded labor practices, increased indebtedness, and marginalization for 
members from the Tharu community (Ibid). Within the Kamaiya labor system, established before 
the mass migration to the Terai, a cultivator offers food, clothing and shelter to a laborer 
(kamaiya) in exchange for labor. Yet, the traditional system occurred in a shared moral economy 
where the cultivator and the laborer shared ethnicity, often kinship, and little difference in 
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economic status (Ibid; Rankin 1999). Following the migration of “high” caste families to the 
Terai, the kamaiya system was transformed into debt bondage with entire families tied to 
dominant landlords socially removed from the Tharu community (Ibid). Tharu resistance to such 
exploitative labor practices was curtailed by violence perpetrated by landlords and the police, 
and, regarding the situation in Dang District, a report issued by a member of the Land Reform 
Commission in 1954 argued “the Government Offices meant for providing Justice take the side 
of the rich people and thus encourage further suppression of the poor” (Guneratne 2002: 98).  
More people were forcibly disappeared from Bardiya than any other district in Nepal 
during the armed conflict. What was previously defined as the Mid-Western Region of Nepal, 
where Bardiya is located, is now commonly recognized as the region most affected by the 
conflict in terms of gross violations of human rights. A 2008 publication by the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) describes how members of the Tharu 
community were targeted during the armed conflict: 
Members of the Tharu indigenous group, who make up 52 % of the population in Bardiya 
District, account for over 85 % of the persons disappeared by the State authorities in 
cases documented by OHCHR. Among the victims [documented by OHCHR] were 123 
men (including 102 Tharus), 12 women and 21 children. All the women and children 
[disappeared] were of Tharu origin. Information provided to OHCHR leads to the 
conclusion the majority of the disappeared were civilian villagers who were not CPN-M 
[Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist] members at the time of arrest. Most of the victims 
were farmers and others were labourers, students, teachers and carpenters. In addition to 
their occupations, several were prominent Tharu activists. The Tharus constitute one of 
the several indigenous groups that are historically marginalized and discriminated in 
Nepal. Many of the disappeared that were not Tharu were also from economically 
disadvantaged sectors of the population (OHCHR 2008: 6). 
  
Robins (2011) contends the Nepal Army in the region had an interest in enforcing 
traditional power relations and disposing of Tharu activists. Many perceived the conflict as a 
continuation of a conflict over land between the Tharu community and “high” caste landlords 
(Ibid). A 2008 OHCHR Report recognizes “the root of the conflict” and the high number of 
enforced disappearances in Bardiya as connected to “issues of land distribution and lack of 
access to economic resources for marginalized groups, as well as discrimination, lack of political 
representation and lack of access to state services and protection” (OHCHR 2008: 7).  
Since Nepal was united into a single kingdom in the 1700s, the Kathmandu Valley has 
served as the economic and political center for the country leaving Nepalis living in rural 
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villages to be excluded from access to resources and political power. When the armed conflict 
began in 1996, poverty rates in rural Nepal were twice as high as urban areas (CBS, Poverty 
Trends in Nepal 1995-1996). Inequality was exacerbated during the conflict, and by 2004, the 
poverty rate in rural areas was more than three times higher than in urban areas (Ibid, 2003-
2004). Although Nepalis in rural areas were excluded from political power and basic resources, 
they were not spared from state violence before or during the armed conflict (Robins 2011, 2012; 
Shneiderman 2003; Thapa, et al. 2012). 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Transitional Justice 
 The conflict officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the 
Nepal government and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist in 2006. The cessation of conflict 
and the peace agreement ultimately emerged due to the rising unpopularity of the king, 
Gyanendra. According to official reports, in June 2001, Prince Dipendra shot and killed King 
Birendra, the Queen, and eight other members of the royal family. The king’s brother, 
Gyanendra, then became king. It is widely speculated that King Gyanendra was involved in the 
deaths of the royal family. Following the killings, the mainstream political parties continued to 
support the monarchy. King Gyanendra dismissed parliament in 2002, and in 2005, dismissed 
another government that he had appointed, imposed a state of emergency, arrested political 
leaders, and established direct rule as the head of the government. This led the way for an 
alliance of Nepali political parties, known as the Seven Party Alliance, to join with the Maoists 
in peace negotiations and sign the 12-point understanding in India in November 2005. This, in 
turn, was the basis for Jana Andolen II (People’s Movement II) in April 2006 when Nepalis 
demonstrated for 19 days across the country calling for the cessation of armed conflict, the 
restoration of democracy, and greater political and economic inclusion for marginalized groups. 
As a result of the demonstrations, the king reinstated parliament and returned power to political 
party leaders. Following the signing of the peace agreement in November 2006, the Maoists 
became part of the Nepali government as an official political party. In this dissertation, when I 
refer to the Nepali government or the Nepali state after the armed conflict, this is also inclusive 
of the Maoist party. My interviewees also now see the Maoists as part of the state.  
 Nepal’s peace agreement is considered “revolutionary” in its explicit focus on economic and 
social justice (Pasipanodya 2008: 385). It stipulates an end to discrimination “based on class, 
ethnicity, language, gender, culture, religion, and region and to address the problems of women, 
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Dalit, indigenous people, ethnic minorities (Janajatis), Terai communities (Madheshis), 
oppressed, neglected and minority communities and the backward areas” and calls for 
“socioeconomic transformation” and a restructuring of the state (CPA 2006). 
 Measures under the framework of transitional justice, normatively argued to facilitate justice 
and reconciliation after the cessation of an armed conflict, were proposed in the peace agreement 
as a means to redress conflict-era violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. 
In the peace agreement, both sides to the conflict agreed to make public the names and addresses 
of people killed or disappeared during the conflict, provide information about the killed and 
disappeared to their family members, create relief and rehabilitation programs for victims, and 
establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In addition, both sides agreed impartial 
investigations would be conducted and legal actions would be taken against those responsible for 
rights violations. Concerning children, both sides agreed to “immediately stop all types of 
violence against women and children,” and immediately rescue children affected and provide 
appropriate assistance for their rehabilitation. Regarding the redress of violations specifically 
affecting children, teachers, and education, the peace agreement states that the “right to 
education to all should be guaranteed and respected…[and] the right to education should not be 
violated… [and both sides] agree to immediately put an end to such activities as capturing 
educational institutions and using them, abducting teachers and students, holding them captives, 
causing them to disappear” (CPA 2006). 
Despite a war that was fought on rhetoric espousing greater inclusion of marginalized 
groups, women and conflict victims were noticeably absent during the signing of the peace 
agreement. Powerful Nepali leaders have designed transitional justice processes, not as a post-
conflict means to redress conflict-era violations, but to escape prosecutions for war crimes. 
Although Nepal’s government has remained unstable since the signing of the peace agreement, 
the most powerful leaders to both sides of the conflict have maintained power since it’s 
cessation. Further, scholars have drawn attention to how the mechanisms of transitional justice 
proposed in the peace agreement (i.e. truth commissions) were imposed by international actors 
and inappropriate for the Nepali context given the vulnerability and exploitation of the existing 
judicial structure and likelihood that “reconciliation” would be utilized for political gain and as a 
means to escape prosecution (Robins 2012; Sajjad 2013, 2016). For example, due to concerns 
over the prosecutions of Maoist leaders that could result from the findings of a truth and 
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reconciliation commission, Maoist leaders insisted on the establishment of a separate 
disappearance commission due to the majority of disappearances being attributed to state 
security forces (Sajjad 2013).  
Further, as is typical, the role of international actors in human rights violations during 
Nepal’s armed conflict was not acknowledged through the peace process. For example, although 
the United States Department of State acknowledged the government’s dismal record of human 
rights violations in its annual human rights report, the U.S. supported the monarchy and supplied 
aid, equipment, and training to state security forces that was subsequently utilized in the killings 
and disappearances of civilians. Yet, processes of transitional justice offer no form of 
acknowledgement for international involvement in internal armed conflicts.  
While victims’ groups have continually expressed concerns that the truth commissions 
would be co-opted by powerful political leaders to ensure their escape from prosecutions, 
international consultants, along with the peace secretariat, introduced the idea of creating two 
truth-seeking commissions (Sajjad 2016). Thus, the commission envisioned in the peace 
agreement, and finally established in 2015, has served as a performance of “justice” rather than a 
commission to seek truth or ensure victims receive justice. Notably, the word “justice” was 
removed from the section on the truth commission in final peace agreement as a result of 
pressure from political party representatives. The only government-instituted comprehensive 
mechanism of transitional justice enacted prior to the truth-seeking commissions, which were 
established in 2015, was an Interim Relief Program established in 2008, awarding financial 
compensation, medical treatment, scholarships, and/or vocational training for some victims. 
Because the government refused to acknowledge complicity or express any form of regret 
regarding conflict-era human rights violations and since the program was introduced as 
humanitarian relief, the Interim Relief Program is not internationally recognized as a form of 
reparations. Children were specifically targeted for scholarships through the Interim Relief 
Program and were given priority in the Truth and Reconciliation Act and Rules. In Chapter 5, I 
analyze the scholarship provision included in the Interim Relief Program, and in Chapter 6, I 
examine Nepal’s truth seeking commissions. 
Nepal has a long history of state-sanctioned and internationally aided inequality and 
political violence, and the Maoists built the insurgency on the promise of uplifting marginalized 
groups in Nepal, including lower caste groups, indigenous people, women, and children. Yet, 
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despite the focus of the Nepali government on children in transitional justice policy and the focus 
of the peace agreement on redressing systemic economic and social injustice, I argue that the 
implementation of transitional justice mechanisms in Nepal not only failed to address victims’ 
needs, it entrenched ongoing inequality, state-centric nationalism (Lawoti and Hangen 2013), 
and distrust in the national government. 
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Chapter 4 
Children, Locality, and Transitional Justice in Nepal7 
 
 Children are often cited as particularly vulnerable to, and, along with women, the most 
affected by armed conflict (e.g. Impact of Armed Conflict on Children 1996; Parmar, et. al 2010; 
UN Approach to Transitional Justice 2010). Yet, despite the emphasis in international law, 
reports, and resolutions on their vulnerability and need for special protection during wartime 
(e.g. CRC 1990; Geneva Conventions 1949 and two Additional Protocols 1977; UN Doc. 
A/HRC/21/38 2012; ‘Security Council Resolution 1882,’ UN Doc. S/RES/1882 2009; ‘Security 
Council Resolution 1612,’ UN Doc. S/RES/1612 2005), people who experienced gross violations 
of human rights as children are rarely included in scholarly literature on transitional justice. 
When children are included in scholarship on transitional justice, discourses typically surround 
the reintegration and accountability of child soldiers (e.g. Parmar, et al. is the sole book 
dedicated to broadly examining children and transitional justice). Further, within 
conceptualizations of children and armed conflict, children within a nation-state, and often 
globally, are frequently homogenized. This homogenization risks overlooking which children are 
particularly vulnerable, in what context their vulnerability exposes them to gross violations of 
human rights, and how their diverse positionality impacts their lives after an armed conflict. 
Further, “childhood” is treated as a temporary vulnerability within international law that 
presumably passes when a person reaches the age of 18. From birth until the age of 18, 
international law (Convention on the Rights of the Child; Geneva Conventions and two 
Additional Protocols) codifies humans’ special entitlements and additional protection during 
armed conflict. Yet, transitional justice processes typically happen after an armed conflict has 
ended, and, in many cases, several years after its cessation.  
 Although children in Nepal were victims of direct violence during the armed conflict, 
including forced recruitment, abduction, torture, killing, maiming, disappearance and sexual 
violence (OHCHR 2012), this chapter focuses on children of the unlawfully killed and forcibly 
disappeared. Of the more than 12,000 people who were killed and 1,300 missing (Ibid), the 
majority were men, and many of those men were fathers with multiple children. In Nepal, the 
																																																								
7 An earlier version of this chapter was published in 2018 as “Intersectionality as Locality: 
Children and Transitional Justice in Nepal” in the International Journal of Transitional Justice 
12(1): 64-87. 
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loss of a father carries severe and irreparable consequences for his children and entire family 
throughout their lives. To date, no scholarly research has examined the perceptions and lived 
experiences of the children of the unlawfully killed or disappeared during Nepal’s armed 
conflict.  
 Focusing on the loss of a father illuminates how even for people who experience a similar 
violation of human rights as children, their lives are dynamic and diverse. Victims’ diverse 
identities and their ongoing transitions are often overlooked in transitional justice discourses. 
Although the peace agreement was signed in 2006, during my fieldwork ten years later processes 
of transitional justice were ongoing, and, in some ways, only beginning. This chapter examines 
the perceptions of child victims of Nepal’s armed conflict who have since transitioned out of 
what is recognized as a temporary phase in human lives known as “childhood” and are now, 
according to international law, adults. Through examining their perceptions as adults, I argue 
singling out biological age or any other singular characteristic or subjectivity as the critical 
determinant of why and how a conflict victim experiences vulnerability risks ignoring how their 
positionality correlates with differential experiences of both armed conflict and the transitional 
period.  
 I begin with a review of scholarly literature examining children and armed conflict and “local 
justice.” I contend homogeneous and fixed notions of “children” within discourses on 
transitional justice fail to emphasize the transitions experienced in people’s everyday lives. Then, 
I briefly review aspects of Nepal’s history of systemic exclusion and marginalization, and outline 
my methodology. Next, I highlight children’s dynamic and diverse experiences during Nepal’s 
armed conflict and explore the perceptions of Nepalis who were children when their fathers were 
killed or disappeared during the armed conflict. Through examining their experiences and 
ongoing transitions, I challenge homogeneous and fixed conceptualizations of “children” and 
“the local” within the context of Nepal and argue for victim-led processes of transitional justice 
and the redress of structural inequality. 
Children and Armed Conflict 
 Overwhelmingly, scholarly literature posits that people who have experienced armed conflict 
as children are traumatized and developmentally impaired (Barber 2009; Boyden and de Berry 
2004). Further, UN agencies and international nongovernmental organizations defining and 
assisting in the implementation of transitional justice measures often treat the constructed 
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categories of “childhood” and “children” as static and universal. Thus, it is commonly taken for 
granted that people who have grown up during armed conflict may respond and adapt to the 
experience of political violence in a variety of ways (Boyden 2003; Kohrt and Maharjan 2009; 
Nordstrom 2006). The complexity of their experiences may be overlooked when a singular focus 
is placed upon the violations children have faced during armed conflict. As Boyden and de Berry 
(2004:xv-xvi) contend, “The suffering of war is not contained in a single traumatic episode, or 
even a multiplicity of such episodes, but in a complex interplay of detrimental circumstances that 
endure and change over time.” 
 This complexity is important to analyze within the context of transitional justice as scholars 
argue the varied experiences and positionalities of people affected by armed conflict as children 
impact their perceptions of and adaptation to post-conflict environments throughout their lives 
(Barber 2009; Boyden and de Berry 2004). The environment in which children live, as well as 
their families, identities, communities, relationships and access to resources are all significant to 
understanding their experiences of both wartime violations and processes of transitional justice. 
Homogenizing children affected by armed conflict overshadows the ways in which their prewar 
positionality creates conditions of vulnerability during armed conflict and differential lived 
experiences during processes of transitional justice. Further, this homogenization fails to 
highlight their resilience or ability to function despite having experienced gross violations of 
human rights and their capability to actively participate in the design and implementation of 
processes of transitional justice implemented on their behalf. Also often overlooked in 
transitional justice discourses are how child victims survive and cope with the resources 
available to them, how access to such resources is gendered or otherwise exclusive based on 
social distinctions, and whether such conditions predate the transitional period and are pervasive 
throughout its tenure.  
Local Justice? 
Based in international law and often implemented with the insistence of the UN and 
international donors and diplomats, scholars examining transitional justice have critiqued 
normative assumptions and emphasized the importance of understanding “local justice,” or the 
ways in which justice is understood, produced, experienced and perceived in specific localities 
(e.g. Hinton 2010; Shaw and Waldorf 2010). Particular attention has been given to how 
transitional justice mechanisms are implemented in ways that are considered “top-down” or 
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“elite-led” as opposed to “bottom-up” and “victim-centric” (LaPlante and Theidon 2007; Lundy 
and McGovern 2008; Robins 2011, 2012; Wilson 2001). Within dialogues on the global/local in 
transitional justice, encounters between “global mechanisms” and “local realities” are often 
understood as ones of “friction” (Hinton 2010; Tsing 2005). As scholars and practitioners have 
challenged global assumptions regarding transitional justice processes, “locality” has often been 
conflated with nationality and presented as opposed to “the global” (Shaw and Waldorf 2010). 
For example, in a report to the UN Security Council, Kofi Annan contends: ‘We must learn to 
eschew one-size-fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead, base our 
support on national assessments, national participation and national needs and aspirations’ (UN 
Doc S/2004/616 2004: 1). 
In Annan’s report, attention is drawn to the importance of a national context but not the 
diversity of experiences within a nation-state. The conflation of the nation-state with “the local” 
ignores historical and existing power structures and ongoing marginalization within a nation-
state. This conflation can reinforce homogenizing and exclusionary nationalist rhetoric and 
practices. Processes of transitional justice are often combined with liberal peacebuilding, and 
significant financial and logistical support from international donors is utilized for the transition 
of a nation-state from its previous form of government to a liberal democracy. The pervasive 
liberal peace model focuses on individual citizens rather than communities and systemically 
ignores structural causes of armed conflict and ongoing structural violence (Galtung 1969). 
Within these contexts, support is state-centric and focused on rebuilding the nation through 
constitution writing, elections and empowering national leaders, without challenging existing 
hierarchies of power and inequality (e.g. Richmond 2002; Robins 2013). Existing scholarship 
has illuminated how international influence over transitional justice processes imports and 
reinforces unequal systems of power and marginalizes the voices of conflict victims (Ní Aolaín 
2009; Wilson 2001). Further, scholars have drawn attention to how processes of transitional 
justice are inescapably political (Hazan 2017) and highlighted how they are utilized or eschewed 
by national governments as a nation-building project (Wilson 2001) and a geopolitical strategy 
(Boehm 2017; Rowen and Rowen 2017). Within this model of post-conflict transition the 
homogenization of victims serves to reinforce the nation-building project without addressing 
ongoing structural violence. 
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As greater attention has been paid to the importance of the context in which mechanisms 
of transitional justice are implemented, scholars have challenged conceptualizations of “the 
local” in human rights and transitional justice discourses. This scholarship has illuminated how 
the binary global/local model can be teleological and analytically confusing (Goodale 2007), 
emphasized that “the local” is always part of national and global processes (e.g. Betts 2005; 
Hinton 2010), and indicated how conflating “the local” with “tradition” or “culture” can exclude 
the knowledge, experiences and priorities of people in particular localities (e.g. Shaw and 
Waldorf 2010). Further, interpretations of “the local” by those designing and implementing 
transitional justice mechanisms are deeply embedded in existing structures of power and 
inequality. Scholars and practitioners emphasizing attention to “the local” within processes of 
transitional justice often fail to examine how experiences of armed conflict and transitional 
justice differ within a nation-state. Ironically, while transitional justice is normatively understood 
as a time of transition, or a liminal state for governments and societies, conceptualizations of 
“the local” are often centered on customary law, rituals and cultural practices presented as 
“traditional” (Burnet 2010; Wilson 2001) or primordial and “static” (Sajjad 2013). 
Homogeneous and Static “Children” 
Likewise, “children” are often presented as static in discourses on transitional justice. The 
importance of children within processes of transitional justice is emphasized in scholarship and 
policy, but people who have aged out of this category of vulnerability are frequently 
subsequently disregarded. Does their experience of armed conflict as children influence their 
lives as adults or does their vulnerability end when they age out of the internationally defined 
category of childhood? Transitional justice policy, although predicated on an ideology of 
transition, fails to respond to victims’ dynamic needs during the “transitional period.” When 
policies are focused primarily on state institutions, such policies present a singular and solipsistic 
set of criteria for understanding “transition” and ignore other kinds of transitions at work in 
people’s everyday lives.  
 In Nepal, understandings of childhood are dynamic, diverse and not based solely on 
biological age (e.g. Kohrt and Maharjan 2009; Snellinger 2009, 2013). Existing research has 
illustrated how children are often perceived as transitioning into adulthood when they “become 
responsible” and “mature” by getting a job, becoming physically developed, focusing on their 
studies and understanding appropriate behavior (Kohrt and Maharjan 2009). Further, 
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conceptualizations of childhood differ within Nepal and are perceived differently according to 
gender and caste (Ibid), and understandings of childhood were challenged during Nepal’s 
internal armed conflict (Pettigrew 2007). Children accepted the responsibilities of older family 
members who had died or been conscripted as Maoist cadres, and children were feared as 
possible Maoist informants (Ibid). Ten years after the signing of the peace agreement, most 
Nepalis who experienced gross violations of human rights as “children” (as defined in 
international law) had since transitioned out of that category. Further, the homogenization of 
children during Nepal’s armed conflict ignores their diverse identities, dynamism and the 
systemic marginalization and exclusion of certain groups based on their gender, religion, 
language, ethnicity, caste and region of residence. As previous scholars have illuminated, 
utilizing the national level as a unit of analysis to study armed conflict fails to capture people’s 
lived experiences and obscures international complicity and other dynamics crucial to 
understanding conflict, such as social, political, and economic factors (Drexler 2010; Lubkemann 
2008, Shneiderman 2012; Thapa, Ogura, and Pettigrew 2012). Lubkemann (2008:28) argues 
there was not a single Mozambican war, and “when cast as a socially homogenizing, rather than 
socially informed, force, violence is inevitably operationalized at the largest scale of its 
occurrence-typically the nation” and calls for greater attention to the social condition of war.  
Transitional justice processes always take place within politicized structures and can 
reproduce systems of power and privilege, and scholars have demonstrated how mechanisms of 
transitional justice can be exclusionary to victims (O’ Rourke 2015; Sundar 2004; Robins 2012, 
2013; Sajjad 2016; Wilson 2001). For example, processes of transitional justice often fail to 
examine patriarchy and gendered experiences (Aguirre and Pietropaoli 2008; Ní Aoláin 2009; Ní 
Aoláin and Rooney 2007). When gender is included in dialogues surrounding transitional justice, 
descriptions easily slip from gender to women (Porter 2016; Hamber 2007). Further, women who 
live through war and conflict cannot easily be homogenized (Simic 2016; Meintjes, et. al 2002). 
Consequently, scholars have called for greater attention to the concrete ways in which multiple 
inequalities are manifested simultaneously during armed conflict and in everyday life rather than 
reducing women to a single story of victimhood (Bueno-Hansen 2010; Rooney 2007), and have 
argued the interests of the most marginalized should be prioritized (Ní Aolaín 2009). Wilke 
(2003:137) contends, “Complex identities matter not only because we need to represent identities 
more carefully, or because current concepts of discrimination might be insufficient, but also 
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because they are targeted and mobilized in state violence.” 
This was certainly the case during Nepal’s armed conflict, where civilians were targeted 
and mobilized based on intersecting facets of their identities. Both the Communist Party of 
Nepal-Maoist and the Nepali government targeted people based on their age, gender, caste, 
ethnicity, access to resources and region of residence. During my fieldwork, I heard many stories 
of hardship and barriers due to structures of power and inequality. As I listened to people’s 
stories and witnessed their lives, the complexity of the experiences and positionalities of people 
who were children during the armed conflict was evidenced, as was their resilience. Their stories 
of Nepal’s armed conflict and its aftermath cannot be reduced to one story of victimhood, and 
the “local” in Nepal cannot be conflated with the entire nation-state. My research revealed 
victims perceive their positionality as a primary cause of their experiences of human rights 
violations. Scholars and practitioners of transitional justice must question why certain children 
within a given nation-state experience gross violations of human rights and others do not. As 
Paul Farmer (2004:7) has argued, 
Human rights violations are not accidents; they are not random in distribution or effect. 
Rights violations, are, rather, symptoms of deeper pathologies of power and are linked 
intimately to the social conditions that so often determine who will suffer abuse and who 
will be shielded from harm. 
 
Likewise, Ní Aoláin and Rooney (2007: 347) contend, “gendered, social patterns of 
suffering are linked to patterns of inequality that preceded conflicts.” In Nepal, social patterns of 
suffering are linked to deeply entrenched patterns of inequality existent long before the armed 
conflict.  
Children’s Experiences During Nepal’s Armed Conflict 
Scholarly literature and reports issued by non-governmental organizations, international 
non-governmental organizations, and the UN emphasize children’s unique vulnerability during 
Nepal’s decade-long internal armed conflict (‘Conflict in Nepal and It’s Impact on Children;’ 
HRW 2004; Pherali 2011; Subedi 2013; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/107 2006). Yet, many Nepalis 
who were children during the armed conflict did not experience or even witness political 
violence; others were raped, tortured, abducted by the Maoists, arrested by state security forces; 
some endured the loss of multiple family members (personal interviews with conflict victims 
January-December 2016; OHCHR 2012). Both the Maoists and the state security forces targeted 
and mobilized children and their families based on their identities and subjectivities. In the 
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context of Nepal, family dynamics, geography, gender, ethnicity, caste, access to resources and 
political connections all determined which children suffered abuse or were shielded from harm. 
Children in rural areas were more likely to witness and be affected by political violence than 
children in Nepal’s capital, Kathmandu (OHCHR 2008, 2012). Dalits and members of 
indigenous communities were disproportionately victimized and harassed by both government 
forces and the Maoists (Goyal, et al. 2005; OHCHR 2012; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/107 2006). 
Conversely, civilians with greater access to resources and from “higher”-caste groups historically 
associated with positions of privilege and power were also particularly vulnerable during the war 
due to their positionality (Amnesty International 1997; OHCHR 2012; Pettigrew 2013). From the 
first day of the armed conflict, not only did the Maoists violently target buildings and people 
associated with the state (e.g. police posts, administrative offices, loan documents in the 
government-owned agriculture development bank), they also attacked wealthy landowners, who 
were declared enemies of the party (OHCHR 2012). Pettigrew and Adhikari (2009) found the 
Maoists targeted villagers who were better resourced (“people with large houses, guns, money, 
and gold”) when asking for food and accommodations.  This, in turn, placed those villagers at an 
increased risk of being targeted by the Nepal Army, who were perceived as “trigger happy” 
(Ibid). Interviews and conversations with people from marginalized caste and ethnic groups who 
had access to resources and fled to Kathmandu during the armed conflict revealed how money 
and political connections to various political parties, including both sides to the conflict, also 
shielded some children and entire families from harm. Males were more likely to be killed or 
disappeared during the conflict (OHCHR 2012). Yet, when women and girls were killed, 
particularly by the Nepal Army, they were often raped first (Ibid). 
There are discernible patterns of victimhood based on longstanding marginalization and 
inequality revealed through the analysis of reports on Nepal’s armed conflict (Ibid; Goyal, et al. 
2005, OHCHR 2008) further affirming the experience of armed conflict was not homogeneous 
for children in Nepal. For example, poor girls from rural areas who were members of “low”-
caste or indigenous communities were more likely to be raped, killed or lose their fathers to 
enforced disappearance or murder than “high”-caste boys living in Kathmandu (OHCHR 2008, 
2012). However, Nepalis were not immune to harm perpetrated by either side to the conflict 
based solely on their positionality. Being “high” caste or wealthy did not always protect Nepalis 
from state violence. Likewise, although the Maoists claimed to be fighting on behalf of women, 
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children, indigenous groups, “low”-caste groups and the poor, those subjectivities did not protect 
Nepalis belonging to these categories from violence perpetrated by the Maoists.  
In the next section, I examine the experiences and perceptions of Nepalis who were 
children (according to international law) when their fathers were unlawfully killed or forcibly 
disappeared during the armed conflict. Although they were younger than 18 years of age when 
they lost their father, more than a decade has passed since the official end to the armed conflict. 
Their narratives reveal commonalities and differences, demonstrating the incongruity of 
conflating “the local” or “children affected by armed conflict” with the entire diverse nation of 
Nepal.   
Children whose Fathers were Killed or Disappeared 
Regardless of their positionality, children whose fathers were killed or disappeared 
during Nepal’s armed conflict faced considerable hardships. All the interviewees whose father 
was killed or disappeared lived with their father’s natal family during the armed conflict, as is 
the dominant practice in Nepal (see e.g. Tamang 2002 for the diversity of women’s experiences 
outside of dominant practices). While broad generalizations about Nepali children are 
inappropriate due to their tremendous diversity, regardless of their positionality, my interviewees 
consistently mentioned the stigmatization of children who lost their fathers during the armed 
conflict. The absence of their fathers forced them to endure stigmatization within their families, 
communities and/or schools. Although all of the interviewees were part of family units that 
consisted of siblings and a mother, they discussed being called “orphan” and “fatherless” by 
teachers and fellow students at school and when walking in their villages.  
Gender norms vary in Nepal, particularly by ethnic group. Yet, predominant patriarchal 
norms in Nepal dictate that a child’s father determines belonging, both to the family and the 
nation-state. The Citizenship Act of 1964 linked citizenship by descent solely to a child’s father. 
This gendered notion of national belonging was reinforced through Nepal’s 2015 constitution, 
which limits a mother’s ability to independently bestow citizenship to her children. For example, 
the child of a Nepali mother and non-Nepali father can only acquire citizenship through 
naturalization. Nepal’s constitution also stipulates that the child of a Nepali mother can obtain 
citizenship by descent only if the child’s father cannot be traced. Thus, being Nepali is legally 
tied to having a Nepali father.  
Although male and female children were equally likely to lose their father during the 
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armed conflict, their postwar experiences were highly gendered and the impact of the loss of 
their father exacerbated by gender norms. In Nepal, dominant norms dictate that men are the 
financial caretakers of their wives, children and elderly parents. The birth of a son is recognized 
as a permanent family member within their natal household. Conversely, dominant norms dictate 
that a daughter will reside with and take a dowry to her husband’s natal family. Although there 
are multiple and complex variations on these practices throughout Nepal, the postwar 
experiences of my interviewees were impacted by dominant gender norms predating the armed 
conflict. Children’s experiences of losing their fathers during the conflict subsequently became 
another aspect of their identities.  
Likewise, interviewees discussed the stigmatization of their mothers who, following the 
loss of their husbands, were harassed by the Maoists and/or state security forces, refused 
assistance by government officials, stigmatized and called “widows,” “whores” and “old 
women,” viewed as polluted in their communities, and treated as burdens by their in-laws. Wives 
of the disappeared experienced additional distress and stigmatization due to their ambiguous 
identities as neither wife nor widow (Robins 2011, 2012). Within these contexts, I heard 
numerous stories of and witnessed everyday resistance to the stigmatization faced by the 
interviewees and their mothers. Some interviewees’ mothers joined victims’ organizations, 
rejected the label of “widow” and lived outside of their in-laws’ homes. As children, some 
interviewees refused to stop attending school regardless of the stigmatization they faced by 
fellow students and teachers. The stigmatization faced by conflict victims during and after the 
armed conflict demonstrates how systems of patriarchy, caste-based and gender-based 
discrimination, and other forms of systemic oppression and structural inequality, are reinforced 
and contested in everyday life in Nepal. 
For better-resourced interviewees who were able to relocate to Kathmandu, life in 
Nepal’s urban center offered them an opportunity to escape the stigma they endured in their 
villages. The urban space served, at times, to give them a sense of anonymity and separation 
from reminders of the loss of their father. All interviewees perceived the loss of their father as 
the cause of their inability to obtain greater access to education and financial resources, and they 
associated their father’s death with his positionality, including his caste or ethnic group, access to 
resources, residence and gender. The Transitional Justice Reference Archive (TJRA), which 
documented violations of international law during Nepal’s armed conflict, and the 2012 OHCHR 
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Nepal Conflict Report (citing the TJRA), attribute the majority of “unlawful killings” to the 
Maoists and the majority of “enforced disappearances” to the government of Nepal (TJRA, as 
cited in OHCHR 2012; OHCHR 2008). While some interviewees whose fathers were 
disappeared clearly communicated distress due to their father’s ambiguous status and expressed 
desires for a funeral ceremony and greater knowledge about the events related to his 
disappearance, most interviewees stated they were certain their fathers had died during the armed 
conflict. Despite this certainty, children of the disappeared faced additional difficulties. They 
lamented their inability to acquire a death certificate and thus the necessary documentation to 
receive citizenship and their father’s financial assets.  
In conversations and semi-structured interviews with children of the disappeared from the 
Tharu community in Bardiya, respondents expressed feeling that the state was anti-Tharu and 
their ethnicity was the reason for their parent being targeted during the armed conflict. After the 
conflict, females and males expressed their hardships as directly related to their own age and 
gender, access to resources, and the difficulties associated with the loss of the male head of 
household and primary breadwinner. Reema, a female member of the Tharu community, 
described in the Tharu language the night her father was disappeared:  
The police arrested my father when he was asleep. At midnight, I think it was 12 o’clock; 
they arrested him and took him away…They [Nepal’s security forces and Nepalis who 
are not members of the Tharu community] treat Tharu people bad wherever they go. 
 
Speaking of the impact of her father’s disappearance, Reema continued, 
It had a huge impact. We were small, and my mom was alone. The other family members 
(paternal grandfather, paternal uncle and his wife) would not love us, since we were all 
girls. [Because my father was disappeared], the police also tortured my 
family…Sometimes, when money is scarce, I remember my father. Since father is not 
there, people scold me. So, I feel sad. There is no male member, so they scold. 
 
Reema, who was 19 at the time of the interview, spent her days helping her mother with 
household chores and working outside the house. On a typical day, she cooked food, cut grass 
and fed the goats her family received from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
Reema said she was unable to complete her education due to the lack of resources at her school. 
Because she was unable to educate her, Reema’s mother told me she planned to get Reema 
married in the next year. 
Male children faced other barriers, with the eldest son sometimes being expected to take 
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on the role of the primary breadwinner. Juktilal, a male member of the Tharu community, 
explained in the Tharu language: 
He [my father] was arrested and then killed by the police. I was 10 or 11. My father was 
the one who used to earn…So, on the one side, I had to earn, and on the other side, I had 
to study. I had to look after the house. The eldest son had to bear the responsibility, so I 
had to bear it…The responsibility of agriculture was on me. The responsibility to educate 
my sister was on me, and all the responsibility to go to the field was on me. My mom 
used to sell vegetables, and we used to raise goats and chickens and sell them.  
 
Rather than viewed as a financial burden, his new positionality placed him in a crucial 
and respected position in terms of his family’s survival. Juktilal told me that his father was Tharu 
and killed by the police while he was traveling in a neighboring district. Juktilal said he had 
heard from eyewitnesses that the police asked his father where he was from, and, after 
responding that he was from a village in Bardiya, they killed him. The police, Juktilal assumed, 
killed his father because he was a member of the Tharu community from Bardiya, and he 
believed his father’s remains were in the jungle of a neighboring district. Both Reema’s and 
Juktilal’s fathers are listed as missing by the ICRC. Female interviewees, including Reema, 
commonly expressed feelings of physical and financial insecurity due to the loss of their fathers. 
Reema and Juktilal were noticeably thin and expressed ongoing distress regarding their lack of 
access to education and basic resources, including food. Further, they both expressed feeling as if 
they were doubly stigmatized for being Tharu and viewed as fatherless.  
Although state security forces targeted members of the Tharu community due to their 
ethnicity, they were not excluded from violence perpetrated by the Maoists. Sumitra, a 21-year-
old female interviewee from the Tharu community in Bardiya, described the day her father was 
abducted and killed by the Maoists. Sumitra’s father supported the Nepali Congress Party, a 
political party associated with the Nepali government during the armed conflict, and opposed the 
Maoist insurgency. She expounded in the Tharu language, 
[The Maoists came in our house at night and] took my father saying, ‘we have some 
work.’ Immediately after that, they locked the door and said, ‘we will cut you, kill you.’ 
They locked the door, so that we could not go outside. They turned off the lights, and at 
that time, there was no light. After ten or fifteen minutes, [upon mom’s insistence], we 
came out breaking the door. We all started to search for my father walking in different 
directions, but he was taken away from the main road. We asked for help, but nobody 
came. Later, we knew the Maoists had threatened the villagers that if they helped, they 
would be shot and killed. We searched but could not find my father. Five minutes after 
we reached our home, we heard the gun shot. Then, we started crying thinking that our 
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father is no more. Where to go for searching my father? Even then, we started to search… 
After the murder, we searched but could not find him…My father’s sister came to our 
house and informed us [he was dead], and we all started crying. We left for the place 
where the dead body was placed, and we saw blood spots on the road. Then we knew my 
father was killed. We ourselves carried him. Nobody helped. 
 
Sumitra’s mother said when she attempted to receive help from the Nepal Army after her 
husband’s death, she was turned away, “kicked” and “scolded.” Despite her husband’s 
opposition to the Maoist insurgency, Sumitra’s mother’s gender and ethnicity delayed her ability 
to acquire assistance from state forces. Sumitra described being called an orphan at school by 
students and teachers and detailed how fellow villagers refused to let her mother touch their food 
for fear of bad luck. When I interviewed Sumitra, she and her mother continued to face 
stigmatization as members of the Tharu community, as females in a home without male 
members, and as victims of the Maoists in a majority Tharu village where most victims of 
Nepal’s armed conflict were victims of state security forces. As a result, Sumitra lamented how 
other victims in the village failed to communicate information about any programs implemented 
to assist conflict victims due to their perceptions of her. Although he had left the village, 
Sumitra’s brother sent money to their mother. In addition, Sumitra and her mother received a 
small income from their occasional work in the village and harvested their own food. 
 People who are considered privileged by Nepali standards were also targeted during the 
armed conflict based on their positionality. The Maoists targeted civilians based on their above-
average access to resources, education level and associations with people in positions of 
influence and power (OHCHR 2012; Pettigrew 2013). The leader of a national victims’ group 
suggested I talk to Sunil. I called him, and he asked me to meet him at a popular bus park in 
Kathmandu. Sunil arrived on his motorcycle, and we went to a restaurant nearby. As I sat across 
from him at the restaurant, I noted his appearance. I guessed Sunil was around 5’10” and 
weighed about 200 pounds. He wore what looked like new clothes: a plaid button-up shirt, blue 
jeans and black tennis shoes with a large silver watch. As we waited for momos (dumplings), 
drinking Sprites, I asked him to tell me about his family. He said in English, 
I am born in a middle class family, me, myself, brothers and two sisters. When I was 12, I 
lived in [a district outside of Kathmandu]. My father was a teacher and master of a 
government school. My mother was a housewife. She is a social worker, too, an educated 
woman in my village. In our village, my family is educated in comparison with other 
families, because it is a rural area. 
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As we continued talking, he also said his family was very respected in their village due to 
their “high”-caste status as Brahmins and level of education. Sunil explained that his family had 
greater access to financial resources than other families in his village. He believed his father was 
targeted due to these factors. 
The terrorists of the Nepal Government (Maoists) killed my father when I was 12. My 
brother was in Kathmandu at that time. Mother had made food for us that night, and we 
had guests in our home. We were having dinner when two people called my father. They 
said they had some work with him. I said, ‘I want to come with father,’ but they said, 
‘you are too small, you cannot come,’ and I cried. My mother was awake, waiting for him 
the whole night, but he did not come back. I also did not sleep till 11 or 12. My mother, 
early in the morning the next day, went to another village searching for my father, but she 
did not find him. Then me, my father’s brother, and [my] sister went near from our land, 
and I saw my father’s dead body, and I cried, and the villagers came. They killed my 
father because he was educated. Villagers used to follow what he said and respected him. 
So, the Maoists might have thought if they kill my father, everyone will be in their 
power. 
 
As Sunil and I continued to talk, he described aspects of his life after his father’s death. 
Like Reema, Juktilal and Sumitra, he and his family began to face stigmatization in their village. 
Yet, unlike Reema’s, Juktilal’s and Sumitra’s families, Sunil’s family had access to resources to 
leave the village. Because Sunil was male, he was sent out of the village within a year for better 
educational opportunities while his sisters remained in the village. When Sunil was 13, he moved 
to Kathmandu, lived with his maternal uncle and attended private school. His entire nuclear 
family eventually left the village, with one brother working in the US, another brother and his 
mother living together in Kathmandu, and his sisters living with their husbands in other cities in 
Nepal. His family, he said, continues to own land and a house in his natal village. Like many 
conflict victims who relocated to Kathmandu during the armed conflict, Sunil utilized his change 
of residence as a means to escape the social stigma related to his father’s death and took 
advantage of the increased educational and employment opportunities available in the capital. 
Sunil was 28 at the time of the interview and had just completed the coursework for his 
bachelor’s degree in management. He is currently running his own non-governmental 
organization in Kathmandu.  
Other interviews with Nepalis whose fathers were killed or disappeared complicated 
common narratives of the armed conflict and further emphasized the need for attention beyond 
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homogeneous conceptualizations of victims in processes of transitional justice. Sumedh, who 
was 25 years old and residing in Kathmandu at the time of the interview, described his family’s 
positionality within their village (in a district outside of Kathmandu) and how he thought it was 
related to his father’s disappearance by the Nepal Army. He specified in Nepali, 
Our family was rich at that time [during the conflict], because we are Brahmin caste. In 
Brahmin caste, all people respect us. My grandfather was a landlord and was an 
intellectual person in the village. My father was also an intellectual person. We owned 
lots of land. In the village, we were rich among other people. Then that was good. At that 
time [during the conflict], my father and my brother were taking a bus to Kathmandu. I 
was 12 years old and studying in class 6, and my brother was studying in 8 class. At that 
time, the Army force was searching buses and people’s bags on the way to the next 
district. In my father’s bag, he had lots of documents and money. He had around 50,000 
to 80,000 rupees (US$500–$800), and they [the Army] asked him why he had lots of 
money. They arrested him. They said to my brother, ‘in the evening, we will return your 
father.’ They said that, but they didn’t return him. My father was a normal person. He 
was not involved in any political party. When my mother, brother, and grandmother went 
to the Army barracks and asked why he was arrested, a person came out and scolded my 
family and beat them with pipes. 
 
Although they had greater access to resources and were “high” caste, the positionality of 
Sumedh’s family did not protect them from state violence during the armed conflict. Yet, his 
family’s wealth provided him with the resources to complete his master’s degree after the 
disappearance of his father.  
Although the data presented in this chapter correlate caste status and access to financial 
resources, they cannot be conflated. In Nepal, being higher caste does not necessarily mean 
having greater access to resources. Likewise, belonging to the Tharu community does not 
necessarily indicate a family’s financial standing. However, access to resources in Nepal is 
correlated with historical patterns of exclusion and marginalization. All the interviewees in this 
chapter perceived the loss of their father as connected to their family’s positionality and 
described similar experiences of stigmatization. Most interviewees’ access to education and basic 
resources following the loss of their fathers depended on preexisting conditions of hierarchy, 
marginalization and their families’ access to resources.   
Reema, Juktilal, Sumitra, Sunil and Sumedh all emphasized that continuing their 
education was very important. In Nepal, the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) is known as “the 
iron gate.” Failing the SLC prevents many students from advancing from grade 10 to what is 
referred to in Nepal as “plus two” (grades 11 and 12). Completing “plus two” is a necessary step 
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to go on to post-secondary education in Nepal. The disparity in the SLC pass rate between 
students who attend public school and those who attend private school is remarkable. According 
to the District Education Office in Bardiya, the SLC pass rate for children attending public 
schools is 22 percent, while children in private schools have an 85 percent pass rate. Nepal’s 
national discrepancy in the SLC pass rate for public and private school attendees is almost 
identical to the situation in Bardiya district, with slight annual variations. Reema, Juktilal and 
Sumitra all attended public school in Bardiya. Sunil and Sumedh attended private school in 
Kathmandu. Despite Juktilal’s increased responsibilities as the eldest male in his family, he 
passed his SLC and was able to complete his “plus two.” Juktilal was among a minority of 
students, regardless of the experience of losing his father, who attended public school and passed 
the SLC. Yet, Juktilal, 27 at the time of the interview, was, at that point, unable to continue to 
postsecondary education due to family obligations and a lack of financial resources. Sumitra also 
passed her SLC and started pursuing her bachelor’s degree. However, poor health and lack of 
access to sufficient resources, including healthcare, prevented her from attending classes. All the 
interviewees prioritized education, but their varied positionalities determined their access and 
ability to pursue educational opportunities.  
Although they were all younger than the age of 18 and considered “children” according 
to international law when they experienced a gross violation of human rights, their age at the 
time of the violation, gender, education level, access to resources, birth order, family support (or 
lack thereof) and caste or ethnic group have affected their lives during the “transitional period.” 
Reema was not opposed to prosecutions. Juktilal stated explicitly he would like the police who 
killed his father to be prosecuted. However, in their interviews, they both prioritized access to 
education and basic resources. Sumitra said the most important needs of conflict victims were 
education and access to jobs and also expressed an explicit desire to see the people responsible 
for her father’s death punished. Conversely, Sunil emphasized a desire to receive “firstly, the 
reason of my father’s murder and punishment of the wrong doer [who killed my father], and 
secondly, support for my family and my further studies.” 
Yet, processes of transitional justice often fail to acknowledge victims’ differential 
experiences, needs and perceptions within a nation-state. When I asked him how he felt when his 
family received money from the Nepal government as relief for his father’s disappearance, 
Sumedh said, “We are not happy. We don’t need money. We need our father.” As Sajjad 
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(2016:30) has argued, “identification of the homogeneous victim in need of salvation primarily 
through financial assistance has been a consistent but oversimplified theme in Nepal.” Despite 
Robins’ (2011: 85-86), argument that “the needs of victims’ families are not static” and his 
finding of “dramatic differences” in victims’ perceptions of justice based on their positionality, 
transitional justice policies in Nepal have framed children affected by armed conflict as static 
and homogeneous.  
Reema, Juktilal and Sumitra all viewed the postconflict national government as anti-
Tharu. While caste and class cannot be conflated, government-supported suppression of the 
Tharu community is linked to their significantly lower access to resources, particularly land. 
After the loss of their fathers, Reema, Juktilal and Sumitra were all expelled from their fathers’ 
natal homes. This was due not only to entrenched systems of patriarchy where a child’s father 
marks their own familial belonging but also to their paternal family’s lack of access to resources. 
Conversely, Sumedh’s paternal grandparents had acquired sufficient wealth before his father’s 
disappearance to maintain their survival in his absence, and it was Sunil’s maternal family that 
ensured his access to higher education in Kathmandu. For Sunil and Sumedh, leaving their 
villages and residing in the nation’s capital also provided them the anonymity to escape social 
stigma. Although Sunil and Sumedh benefited from existing hierarchies, they both explicitly 
indicated their desires for, and were actively working towards, more equitable access to 
resources for marginalized populations. While being male, “high” caste and having access to 
resources could not mitigate the emotional or financial impact of losing their fathers, their 
prewar positionality determined their access to resources after the war. Even within the same 
nuclear family, gender norms determined access to education. Additionally, despite their 
positionality, Sunil and Sumedh expressed feeling marginalized and disconnected from the 
national and international political elites determining transitional justice policies and 
implementation.  
The postwar differential experiences between victims are microcosms of larger systems 
of structural inequality. Although victims in Nepal come from diverse positionalities, the vast 
majority lack access to political power and are excluded from decisions about processes of 
transitional justice implemented on their behalf. Since the signing of the peace agreement, 
international and national elites have dominated transitional justice processes and privileged the 
promulgation of the constitution and national elections over redressing conflict-era violations 
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and ongoing structural violence. The peace agreement called for social and economic justice 
after the war. Yet, structural violence continues to impact the lives of children throughout Nepal, 
who face inequitable access to education, healthcare and food. Higher education was a key 
concern and desire for all of my interviewees, but structures of inequality systemically prevented 
some victims from continuing their education. When I asked interviewees why they wanted to 
pursue higher education, they linked education to dignity, jobs and greater access to resources. 
Regardless of their positionality, they felt disempowered by the loss of their fathers and excluded 
from what they viewed as elite-led processes of transitional justice. Activists and scholars have 
argued for greater inclusion of victims in processes of transitional justice in Nepal and spoken 
out against the orchestrated dependence of victims on elite-led national and international 
agencies to speak on their behalf (Robins and Bhandari 2012). Examining child victims’ diverse 
and dynamic experiences reveals the need for the transformation of hierarchies of power, 
domination, and exclusion.  
Conclusion 
The narratives of people who lost their fathers during Nepal’s armed conflict suggest 
locality cannot be conflated with nationality. Rather, analyses of victims’ perceptions and 
everyday lives illuminate the complexity and dynamism of the experience of victimhood for 
children. All victims of Nepal’s armed conflict, regardless of positionality, deserve equal access 
to justice (however they conceptualize and prioritize the concept).  
It is important to examine what actually changes through processes of transitional justice. 
I argue for greater attention to the transitions occurring in people’s everyday lives. Yet, also 
unexamined or redressed through transitional justice processes are entrenched systems of power 
and inequality. The homogenization of victims suppresses attention to and the redress of the 
structural inequalities intimately tied to Nepal’s armed conflict. So long as powerful elite actors 
drive transitional justice processes without prioritizing victims’ inclusion, acknowledging 
victims’ diversity, and redressing structural inequality, what meaningful transition will occur? 
Hierarchies of power can be shifted to empower conflict victims. Recognizing hierarchies 
among victims does not preclude their ability to design inclusive victim-centric processes of 
transitional justice. As Gready and Robins (2014) argue, scholars and practitioners must ask how 
they can create space for locally led solutions and then provide the requested resources to aid and 
empower conflict victims to implement their own processes. “Local justice” must move beyond 
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essentialism and nationalism, and, further, redress entrenched systems of domination and 
inequality. When oppression, marginalization, and deep-seated inequality are recognized as 
significant factors to an armed conflict, the refusal to redress such conditions is sure to entrench 
them.  
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Chapter 5 
Scholarships for “Children Affected by Armed Conflict” 
 
“Parents don’t know the significance of education for their child. That is the main thing.” 
I was at the district education office sitting next to Balkrishna, an education officer, government 
official, and gatekeeper of scholarship implementation in Bardiya district. As Balkrishna was 
explaining to me the reason why children in Bardiya fail or drop out of school, it struck me as 
ironic that he was simultaneously signing forms brought in by parents to be reimbursed for their 
children’s school snacks. He sat behind his desk dressed in a clean suit as he was signing forms 
one after the other and then dismissing the parents-mothers and fathers whose clothes were worn 
and hands were rough, presumably from agricultural work.  
In my conversations and interviews in Bardiya district, I heard over and over again how 
important education was for individuals and their entire families. I thought back to the day I sat 
outside across from Pradesh, a young man from the Tharu community whose father was 
disappeared by the Nepal Army, as he took a break from working in the field. To my question, 
“what were the effects of your father being taken?” he responded, “The effect is that I didn’t get 
a chance to study in school.” He continued, “The basic need of the conflict victims’ families is 
that their children should get a chance to study up to intermediate level.” When talking about his 
hopes for the future, he said, “I am ready to remain hungry, but I will make my children 
educated.”  
Pradesh’s emphasis on education being both one of the most significant consequences of 
the armed conflict and one of his family’s greatest needs was common for victims that I spoke 
with in both Bardiya and Kathmandu. Yet, access to education before, during, and after the 
armed conflict varied significantly for victims of Nepal’s armed conflict. In the last chapter, I 
argued transitional justice policy often homogenizes victims and fails to responds to their diverse 
and dynamic needs during the transitional period. Concomitantly, I showed how life transitions 
for those affected by conflict as children are simultaneously homogenized by the static category 
of “childhood.” In this chapter, I examine the meanings that victims and their families in Bardiya 
assigned to education and their experiences of inequitable access to scholarships targeting 
“conflict affected children” as part of Nepal’s Interim Relief Program. I begin the next section 
with a conversation I had with one of my friends in Bardiya that illustrates a common narrative 
about the historical significance of education and how education (or lack of) is utilized to explain 
   54 
inequality according to caste, ethnicity, gender, and other identities. I argue that discourses of 
knowing/not knowing are instrumental in the concealment of power and the perpetuation of 
marginalization and structural inequality in Nepal. Through examining the scholarship provision 
for “conflict affected children,” I contend the barriers conflict victims in Bardiya experience 
trying to access scholarships demonstrate not only that structural inequality still exists during the 
“transitional” period but also that the state is committed to maintaining it.  
(Lack of) Education and (Not) Knowing as Proxy 
On a temperate day in February in a rural village in Bardiya, my friend Arita and I were 
sitting together looking out at a rice field. She explained to me, “there is tension between the 
landlords and the Tharu, because they illegally took Tharu land and took advantage of them. 
Tharu people didn’t understand the documents they were signing, because they could not read.” 
Arita, 22 at the time and a member of the Tharu community, was explaining this to me in 
English. She was educated in English medium schools in Kathmandu, as was her father. She 
described what she perceived as the historical and ongoing intention of powerful political leaders 
to marginalize people from the Tharu community by deceiving them, and she described “Tharu 
people” as “unsuspecting,” “simple, “and “backward.” Although she and her father had been 
educated in Kathmandu and both spoke English fluently, she attributed the financial losses of her 
paternal grandfather to his trust of others and not being formally educated. She said, 
Many people have taken advantage of my grandfather, and they have convinced him to 
give them his money. One time a man came and stayed with my grandfather for a couple 
days and convinced him to put a tractor in his name, and my grandfather did it. Then, he 
was making payments for a long time in someone else’s name. The payments were not 
always being counted, because the person taking the payments was not recording that 
they were receiving the money. My grandfather spent all this money and lost the tractor, 
because it was in this other person’s name…That is why my father wanted to become 
educated, things like this. 
 
In conversations with people inside and outside the Tharu community, and in Nepali 
books explaining Tharu people, the community’s “backwardness” and “simplicity” were 
described, typically in the same conversation/book, both as primordial and as due to their lack of 
education (i.e. formal schooling).  
In the context of Nepal’s armed conflict, discourses about knowing, consciousness, and 
education hold significant meanings. On one hand, “Nepalis who participated in the Maoist 
movement were often represented [by Western observers and the Nepali elite] as victims of a 
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sort of false consciousness, or worse, of no consciousness at all” (Shneiderman 2012: 67). On the 
other hand, lack of education/not knowing has long been an explanation of 
inequality/marginalization (e.g. the Tharu exploitation by more educated, literate landlords), and 
teaching basic literacy has been utilized by Nepali activists seeking to build political 
consciousness, for example, among Thangmi villagers (Shneiderman 2013) and as a platform for 
building a movement against exploitative landlords through educating the Tharu (Guneratne 
2002). Guneratne argues that the conceptualization of “Tharus as a backward group, illiterate and 
therefore underprivileged, is an important organizing symbol of their identity” (2002: 194). It is 
around this central narrative of exploitation by educated, “not simply landlords” but by high-
caste hill people “in unambiguously ethnic terms” that elite Tharu leaders began organizing 
members of the Tharu community in the 1950s for greater access to political power and 
resources (Guneratne 2002). In his research on the making of the Tharu identity in Nepal, 
Guneratne found that members of the Tharu Welfare Society 
like Tharus in general, believe that it is through education that the welfare of the Tharu 
may be assured. The catalyst for the founding of the [Tharu Welfare Society] was the 
perception that the Tharu were backward, and the necessity to make their status equal to 
that of other castes (jat). The causes of this backwardness was identified as the general 
illiteracy of the Tharu, which made them vulnerable to exploitation by other groups, and 
the consequent inability of the Tharu to produce the doctors and engineers who, by virtue 
of their professional status, might raise the status of the group as a whole. Education has 
been seen as the means by which a “backward” society may be transformed to a 
“forward” status (Guneratne 2002:139-140). 
 
Ironically, the education of some elite members of the Tharu community in India, along with 
development agencies reinforcing ideas of villagers as backward and uneducated, contributed to 
social constructions of marginalized groups in Nepal as ignorant (Guneratne 2002; Pigg 1992, 
1995). In Pigg’s 1992 study of the introduction of development discourse into Nepali 
communities, she argues that such introductions frame the direction of progress from rural to 
urban and alter what it means to be a villager. She contends, 
The “ignorance” of villagers is not an absence of knowledge. Quite the contrary. it is the 
presence of too much locally-instilled belief…The problem people working in 
development will tell each other and a foreign visitor, is that villagers “don’t understand 
things.” To speak of “people who don’t understand” is a way of identifying people as 
“villagers.” As long as development aims to transform people’s thinking, the villager 
must be someone who doesn’t understand (Pigg 1992: 17, 20). 
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In Nepal, education is utilized as a marker of social status and is measured by phrases to 
describe people, such as “educated,” “uneducated,” “backward,” statements like “she 
could/could not write her name,” and the answers to a common question utilized to mark status, 
“up to how far have you studied?” including “up to class ___,” “SLC pass,” “plus two,” 
“bachelor’s.” Formal education (i.e. schooling) in Nepal has a long history of being a marker of 
social standing and access to resources. Every parent I met in Nepal, regardless of any aspect of 
their positionality, prioritized formal education (i.e. schooling) for their children. For both male 
and female conflict victims, education was explained in interviews and conversations as means 
of upward mobility through a greater chance at employment, and thus income and resources. 
Yet, in the same interviews and conversations, people would describe how jobs in Nepal are 
acquired through nepotism, lament how there are no jobs in Nepal, and discuss the advantages of 
seeking employment outside of the country.  
While it is connected to aspirations for greater economic opportunities, being an educated 
person holds additional meanings and value. To be an ‘educated person’ in Nepal is associated 
with dignity and perceived higher social standing. Previous scholars have argued 
conceptualizations of the ‘educated person’ influences expectations for formal education to be 
transformative in Nepal (Levinson and Holland 1996) and found that young people view learning 
the Nepali language in school as necessary for them to “make their way in the world” (Noonan 
1996: 5) while learning English was a means to reach a “world of promises and new 
opportunities” (Valentin 2011:110; also see Caddell 2006; Liechty 2003; Pradhan 2016). Rather 
than viewed strictly as a stepping stone for personal achievement, existing scholarship has 
illuminated how students also view education as way to help develop the nation and be of service 
to their communities (Fujikura 2003; Skinner and Holland 1996; Snellinger 2016). 
Yet, education in Nepal has always been exclusionary and connected to elite power. 
Under Rana rule (1846-1950), only the ruling elite were permitted by the state to be formally 
educated. Following the end of Rana rule and the implementation of multi-party democracy in 
the 1950s, schools were established throughout the country, including elite private schools 
predominantly run by missionaries in Kathmandu (Caddell 2006). During the Panchayat era 
(1960s-1990s), homogenous nationalist discourse was strongly promoted by the state through the 
slogan ek bhasa, ek dharma, ek bhes, ek desh (one language, one religion, one form of dress, one 
country). While schools were nationalized in the 1960s and 1970s and accompanied by 
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nationalist curricula, donors, including the World Bank, encouraged the decentralization of 
education in the 1980s, and private schooling proliferated in the 1990s (NESAC 1998:87 as cited 
in Caddell 2006). Caddell (2006) argues, the dream of educational opportunity expanded in 
Nepal [in the 1990s] due to optimism that multi-party democracy would lead to greater equality 
and inclusion, and as she contends, significantly, “with educational opportunities opened to all 
through the expanded government school system, the search for ways of differentiating 
achievement intensified” (468). 
The bar of achieving status as an “educated person” was raised when marginalized 
communities gained greater access to education; a significant marker of social status in Nepal is 
now attending private school, especially elite English-medium schools (Caddell 2006; Liechty 
2003). As public education became more accessible, the liberalization of the education market 
and the proliferation of private schools ensured that Nepalis with the greatest access to resources 
retained or increased such resources. The proliferation of formal schools in Nepal has, rather 
creating equal opportunities for historically marginalized groups, entrenched hierarchies of 
power and inequality. Scholars have criticized the influence of donors, such as the World Bank, 
for the continued exclusion of marginalized groups from and through education. For example, 
Mikesell (1993:32) argues, schooling in Nepal is  
an imposition onto the village communities of an alien system of knowledge, priorities, 
values and methods evolved from Western colleges of education. Classroom discipline, 
examinations and certification authoritatively determine what is "true knowledge," and 
devalue the knowledge, practices and languages of the villagers... An immense class of 
people is presently being schooled in Nepal to despise their own rural background. 
 
An explicitly stated intention of formal education in the 1990s was to promote an 
attachment of youth to a developing Nepali nation (Fujikura 2003), develop democratic 
institutions, and foster democratic attitudes and values in children to promote nation-building 
(Carney and Bista 2009). Pherali (2011:144) argues, 
The process of forming ‘a uniquely Nepalese identity’ permeated the concept of the 
modern national education system, which largely denied the existence of ‘a dynamic 
tension with regional and ethnic identities’ undermining the significance of indigenous 
language and culture (Pigg 1992: 497). Educational provision for Janajati (tribal) or 
Aadibasi (indigenous) children was often non-existent since Nepali, the medium of 
teaching and learning at schools, was not often their mother-tongue and the curricula 
were often too ‘foreign’ to engage with… Even in 2001, a full decade after multiparty 
democracy was restored, equal rights were spelled out in the new Constitution, and 
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educational ‘development’ efforts intensified, literacy rates among Brahmins, the so-
called upper caste, were 70% as compared with a dismal 10% among the several low-
status caste groups (Central Bureau of Statistics 2003). This was a failure of externally 
led development to address the country’s most pressing social problems. 
Thus, following the establishment of multi-party democracy in the 1990s, education in Nepal 
served to contribute to a façade of democracy and equality while systemically ensuring the 
continued marginalization and poverty of the majority. Although he contends that Nepal’s 
education system was both alien and alienating, Fujikura (2003) argues the Maoists built on the 
nationalist rhetoric promoted through formal education to produce alternative visions of nation-
building and progress through armed struggle.  
Education and Nepal’s Armed Conflict 
Schools were critical sites during Nepal’s armed conflict. Scholars have described 
education in Nepal as “one of the main causes of the violent conflict” (Pherali 2011: 135) and as 
schools as “battlefields” (Caddell 2006). The Maoists used schools as hideouts, to conduct 
cultural trainings, and to recruit and abduct children for conscription into the People’s Liberation 
Army (Subedi 2013; Shneiderman and Turin 2004; van Wessel and van Hirtum 2013). Teachers 
and principals were also specifically targeted by the Maoists and often abducted, mutilated, and 
killed (Pherali 2011). For the Maoists, teachers were targeted both as community leaders capable 
of influencing the population and as a source of income. Many teachers who refused to provide 
money or otherwise comply with the demands of the Maoists were mutilated or killed. United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO 2010) reported the Maoists 
abducted 21, 998 students and 10, 621 teachers between 2002 and 2006.  
Likewise, the Nepali government sought support from teachers, and teachers suspected of 
supporting the Maoists were arrested, tortured, and killed by state forces (Ibid). Schools were 
used as army barracks (OHCHR Nepal Conflict Report 2012) and targeted by state forces if 
Maoist gatherings were conducted in or around school buildings (Amnesty 2005; ACHR 2005). 
Children suspected of supporting the Maoists were arrested, raped, tortured, and killed by state 
forces (OHCHR Nepal Conflict Report 2012). As a result, children feared attending school due 
to the threat of arrest, abduction, torture, killing, and enforced disappearance by both sides to the 
conflict. Additionally, many people who were killed or declared missing had children, some of 
which witnessed the abduction or arrest of their parent.  
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As described in the previous chapter, the majority of Nepalis killed or declared missing 
during the conflict were men, and most were the sole breadwinner in their family. The loss of a 
male head of household during the conflict had severe economic consequences for their parents, 
wives, and children. Such children were often forced to discontinue their education, seek 
additional employment, take on additional childcare and household chores, and faced 
stigmatization in their communities where fathers were viewed as protectors of safety and 
dignity. Nepal’s peace agreement explicitly calls for an end to capturing educational institutions 
as well as the cessation of holding students and children captive and causing them to disappear 
(2006).  
Scholarships for “Children Affected by Armed Conflict” 
With $23 million of a $50 million grant from the World Bank, the Government of Nepal 
implemented an Interim Relief Program in 2008 and included a scholarship provision for 
“children affected by armed conflict” (Carreza 2012). Yet, the state constructed victimhood so 
that not all Nepalis who experienced gross violations of human rights as children were included 
in the program. The scholarship policy included children who experienced a disability as a result 
of the armed conflict and children whose parents were killed, disappeared, or experienced a 
disability as a result of the conflict. Nepal’s Interim Relief Program is not considered reparations 
according to international standards due to the state’s failure to acknowledge responsibility. 
Rather, the interim relief policy was framed as humanitarian aid or economic assistance intended 
to provide temporary relief until truth commissions were established and a reparations program 
was implemented. Scholars have argued for the potential of victim reparations to aid in social 
and political inclusion (De Greiff 2006; García-Godos 2013) and serve as symbolic 
acknowledgements of structural violence (LaPlante and Theidon 2007). However, I argue the 
only semblance of financial reparations implemented since the signing of the peace agreement 
(i.e. the Interim Relief Program) has served to safeguard the continued exclusion of the most 
marginalized people who experienced gross violations of human rights as children.  
In countries undergoing processes of transitional justice, scholars have drawn attention to 
the politics of victimhood (Bernath 2016; Druliolle 2015; McEvoy and McConnachie 2012; 
Sajjad 2016; Wilson 2001) and illuminated how “notions of victimhood are produced, contested, 
negotiated, adapted and neglected in the context of processes of power-driven social interaction 
that depend on specific social, economic and political conditions” (Waardt 2016:18). 
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Determinations of victimhood may be based on perceptions of innocence (McEvoy and 
McConnachie 2012), ongoing political divisions (Druliolle 2015), or a hierarchy of violations in 
need of redress (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:1-2). The determination of victimhood is 
the starting point of processes of transitional justice aimed to redress human rights violations and 
is crucial for the implementation of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. In Nepal, elite actors 
have determined which violations are worthy of redress through the Interim Relief Program, thus 
conferring victim status to some while systemically excluding many people who experienced 
gross violations of human rights as children. For example, children who were arbitrarily arrested, 
abducted, conscripted as soldiers, tortured, or experienced sexual violence were not qualified as 
victims in the Interim Relief Program.  
Within a context where powerful Nepali leaders are diligently working to escape 
prosecution, the exclusion of some victims from the Interim Relief Program is unsurprising. The 
international money provided for the Interim Relief Program was distributed through the national 
government to district level government education offices. Because transitional justice processes 
have failed to include structural changes, the process of distribution prevented access to people 
from marginalized communities.  
Barriers to Access and Inequitable Access 
For many conflict victims who qualified for interim relief, the process of receiving a 
scholarship was extremely difficult. According to the government official responsible for 
distributing the scholarships in Bardiya, families wishing to receive the scholarship must first go 
to their local village development committee secretary and request a certified recommendation 
letter. From there, they take the letter to the local peace committee where an additional 
recommendation is required. Then, victims must travel to the district headquarters in Gulariya 
where they take the recommendation to the Chief District Officer who then issues a card 
identifying the person as a victim. Further, the birth registration and validation of the relationship 
to the victim must be provided along with a recommendation from the current school the student 
hopes to attend. If the conflict victim is able to complete the process, the school then sends the 
recommendation to the District Education Office (DEO). The DEO sends the recommendation to 
the Ministry of Education in Kathmandu, which decides if the child will receive a scholarship. If 
the child is determined to qualify for the scholarship, the Ministry of Education sends the money 
to the DEO, which distributes the money to the student’s school, family, or the student.  
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While this process is similar in Nepal’s capital, the government offices responsible for 
the distribution of scholarships are more accessible in Kathmandu via public transportation. 
Further, many victims in rural Bardiya do not have legal documentation due to the ongoing lack 
of accessibility to government offices. The majority of conflict victims living in Bardiya were 
facing marginalization and difficulty in accessing healthcare, education, and food prior to the 
outbreak of armed conflict. Nepal’s conflict served to entrench existing inequality and prevent 
access to basic needs. Further, government officials in Bardiya are appointed by the national 
government in Kathmandu. At every level of bureaucracy, conflict victims from the Tharu 
community are faced with male, “high” caste government officials with greater access to 
political connections and financial resources. The requests for documentation by the state 
reinforce marginalized victims’ exclusion from state processes that mark belonging through 
paperwork and citizenship cards. Members of the Tharu community have never had equal access 
to these bureaucratic spaces and mechanisms. Yet, when victims from the Tharu community 
struggle to complete the process required to obtain scholarship money for their children, 
government officials, such as Balkrishna, cite victims’ ignorance, rather than the institutional 
structures, as the most significant barrier.  
Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, houses the national government offices responsible for 
the distribution of the Interim Relief Program. According to the government official responsible 
for the distribution of scholarships in Kathmandu, most children receiving scholarships through 
the Interim Relief Program are attending private school. This is in contrast to children in Bardiya 
receiving the scholarship who are primarily attending public school, according to government 
officials in Bardiya. According to the DEO in Kathmandu, there are more than 1000 private 
schools and about 300 public schools in the district. Even with the scholarship provided through 
the Interim Relief Program, most conflict victims in Bardiya cannot access private school either 
financially or geographically. Rather than offering opportunities for upward mobility through 
education, the scholarships implemented through the Interim Relief Program have done little 
more than distract from demands for greater economic and social equality, political inclusion, 
and an end to poverty and serve the interests of people with greater access to power and 
resources.  
Further, to gain access to knowledge about the Interim Relief Program to initiate the 
process, conflict victims needed to be connected to a conflict victims’ organization, a political 
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party, an international non-governmental organization, or a non-governmental organization. 
Children were defined in the Interim Relief Program as younger than 18 years of age, and some 
victims were unable to receive the scholarship money because they had passed the age of 18 
before they were informed about the program or before their families could complete the 
necessary steps. In the case of scholarships in Nepal, the provision to cap the age of recipients at 
age 18 has been a source of contention and has excluded many victims who have since aged out 
of their qualifying status. Because the scholarship program was not started until 2008, many 
people who were affected by conflict as children did not qualify. Others who qualified as 
“conflict-affected” and met the age requirements at the time the scholarship program was 
launched were unaware scholarships were available. They were thus disqualified from the 
opportunity. Many interviewees lamented that the age cap prevented them from the possibility of 
higher education. Despite several Nepalis’ childhood experiences of gross violations of human 
rights and the subsequent loss of educational opportunities, powerful government officials 
designed the scholarship program to the exclusion of many, particularly the most marginalized, 
victims.  
Regarding the scholarship program in Nepal, one female interviewee whose father was 
disappeared during the armed conflict in Bardiya stated, 
This scholarship for conflict-affected children is good but the way the age limit has been 
prescribed, to provide up to plus two [class 11 and 12], is not satisfactory to me at all. 
When it was declared that scholarships would be given, a lot of time had already passed, 
and I did not get it. So, the conflict victim children should read only up to plus two and 
under the age of 18? Then, above that, we should not read? The age limitation should not 
have been there. The government should educate them as high as they want to study. 
 
Several interviewees who experienced a gross violation of human rights when they were 
younger than 18 years of age stated that they perceived their lack of knowledge of programs for 
conflict victims as due to their lack of political connections. They felt that people with access to 
political power were able to receive government benefits while they were systematically 
excluded. My interviews with conflict victims and government officials responsible for the 
distribution of scholarships in Kathmandu confirmed their suspicion. Additional scholarships 
were provided outside of the Interim Relief Program for children with greater political 
connections. For example, the national government choose children of martyrs for a greater 
scholarship allowance than allotted through the relief program, with no age limit, and if the 
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scholarship recipients stayed in school continuously, they could receive scholarship money all 
the way through their Ph.D. (personal interview with government official in district education 
office Kathmandu). Additionally, some children of the state security forces who died during the 
conflict were provided with free schooling at a school for children of the police and scholarships 
were made available during the armed conflict that provided aid through the master’s degree 
level. A national government official in Kathmandu lamented how once the Maoists gained 
political power, they were able to fund Maoist schools for “children of martyrs” throughout 
Nepal. He contended the schools were breeding grounds for Maoist sympathizers, which caused 
me to think about how state schools train children to be adults who protect the state and promote 
homogeneous forms of nationalism. In the context of transitional justice, this is significant 
because transitional justice mechanisms are meant to redress human rights and humanitarian law 
violations. Nepalis who were tortured or raped by state security forces were excluded from 
scholarship provisions. Further, families of the disappeared (primarily by state security forces) 
and killed as civilians not taking part in combat were systemically excluded from the scholarship 
money by postponing the policies until 2008, providing a smaller amount of money, and placing 
an age limit of 18 years of age. Many interviewees from the Tharu community perceived their 
exclusion as a continuation of the government’s commitments to nepotism and discrimination.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, members of the Tharu community in Nepal view 
their community’s marginalization and poverty as intimately linked to their historical and 
ongoing lack of access to education (Guneratne 2002; personal interviews). Further, education is 
commonly viewed as means to resist hierarchical power arrangements socially, economically, 
and politically (Guneratne 2002; personal interviews). Thus, the inability of people from the 
Tharu community in Bardiya to access the scholarship program was viewed by many 
interviewees as a systemic means of continuing hierarchical power arrangements benefiting 
those with political connections due to their “high” caste status and access to resources (i.e. 
money and land). Many victims are also aware that during the conflict children of state security 
forces were awarded scholarships immediately following the death of their parents. The 
scholarship money for these children was awarded until the recipients reached the age of 21 and 
covered the costs of higher education through the bachelor’s degree. In interviews with recipients 
of the scholarship program for children of the security forces in Kathmandu, the scholarship 
money, along with additional money awarded to their families as financial compensation, has 
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allowed some recipients to relocate to Kathmandu, attend private school, and complete their 
college degrees. Some of the recipients were pursuing their master’s degrees and others had 
siblings who secured jobs in the United States. Although recipients had varying access to 
resources before and after the conflict and faced many hardships following the loss of their 
parents, they were granted greater opportunities to pursue their education through the scholarship 
program.  
Processes of transitional justice aim to redress human rights and humanitarian law 
violations, and the death of a combatant during combat is not categorized as a violation of 
international law. Thus, recipients of the scholarship program for children of deceased security 
forces are not considered mechanisms of transitional justice in Nepal nor are those children 
included in the Interim Relief Program. Yet, Nepalis targeted for the Interim Relief Program due 
to their civilian status are aware of what they perceive as inequitable access to scholarships and 
financial compensation due to the loss of a parent during the armed conflict. Victims with greater 
access to resources, living in urban areas, and connected to political power through family 
members, a victims’ organization, non-governmental organization or international non-
governmental organization, were more likely to receive the financial compensation provided 
through the Interim Relief Program earlier, and their children were subsequently more likely to 
receive the available scholarship money. Victims perceived their exclusion from the scholarship 
program as a continuation of Nepal’s long-standing systemic inequality.  
It is unknown how many people were tortured or experienced sexual violence during the 
armed conflict, and these violations are understood to be vastly underreported (OHCHR Report 
2012; personal interviews with staff from non-governmental organizations working with victims 
of torture and sexual violence). The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Report 
(2012) cites state security forces as being responsible for the highest number of reported cases of 
sexual violence and torture. Females were more likely to experience sexual violence, especially 
in the absence of male family members (OHCHR Report 2012). Being “high” caste and having 
access to greater resources did not shield Nepalis from the experience of state violence during 
the armed conflict. Yet, interviews with staff from non-governmental organizations working with 
conflict victims perceived poor people from “low” caste and ethnic groups to have been more 
likely to have been tortured or experience sexual violence due to their inability to seek redress 
through government institutions dominated by men who were better resourced and “high” caste, 
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thus giving them access to political power. For government officials with connections to the 
Nepal Army during the armed conflict, discouraging attention to these violations ensured their 
continued impunity. Maoist leaders have also been implicated in the conscription of child 
soldiers, which has been an ongoing contentious issue due to the perceived threat of prosecution. 
While the UN facilitated a disarmament program, many former child soldiers never received 
access to the resources necessary to complete their education or complete vocational training that 
would ensure their livelihood.  
Thus, the Interim Relief Program was designed to fail to provide redress for some of 
Nepal’s most marginalized victims. In Bardiya, government security forces, including the army 
and police, arrested and tortured children suspected of being Maoists in order to obtain 
information about the ongoing insurgency (personal interviews). After meeting community 
leaders and conflict victims in Bardiya, they continued to introduce me to people who had been 
arrested by the Nepal Army and tortured when they were younger than 18 years of age. Many of 
my interviewees who were tortured as children were not associated with the Maoists. However, 
they were assumed to be Maoists by state forces due to their membership in the indigenous 
Tharu community. During the armed conflict, the Government of Nepal named the Maoist 
insurgents “terrorists,” offered financial rewards for the capture of Maoist leaders, and instituted 
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance (TADO), curtailed 
fundamental rights, including the right not to be arbitrarily detained, and mobilized the Nepal 
Army unified with the Nepal Police and newly-created Armed Police Force against the Maoists. 
The Maoists publically claimed to be fighting on behalf of historically marginalized groups, 
including indigenous groups such as the Tharu, and some members of the Tharu community in 
Bardiya joined the Maoist insurgency as combatants. Yet, civilians from the Tharu community 
were disproportionately targeted regardless of their personal affiliation with the Maoists 
(OHCHR Bardiya Report 2008), and Tharu became synonymous with terrorist (personal 
conversations, interviews, and observation). For example, a male interviewee from the Tharu 
community named Antaram described how being arrested and tortured hindered his ability to 
excel in school: 
Before I was arrested, my study was so good. I was first from class one to class five. 
After the Nepal Army and the Nepal Police arrested me, my studies suffered. I wanted to 
do better, but I had a kind of fear. All the time I would remember the inhuman behavior 
of the Nepal Army. Because when I was arrested and kept in the Army camp, they would 
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always torture me physically and mentally. They would demand information about the 
insurgency. [They said] ‘If you don’t tell us, we will kill you.’ In this way, I had mental 
torture. In this way, I wanted to do better in my studies, but I was unable. 
 
As Nagengast (2003:122) argues, state violence creates punishable categories of people, 
legitimizes and de-legitimizes certain groups, and enforces behavioral norms. “Torture,” she 
contends, “has another, only partially successful function-to terrorize people into conformity” 
(Ibid). Those who are de-legitimized are often blamed for their own oppression or torture 
(Nagengast 2003). Practices of war against a magnified enemy, such as terrorism, and discourses 
of power prevent the illumination of differences in power and the internal violence of the state 
(Ibid). Other interviewees, primarily from the Tharu community, deemed “terrorists” during the 
armed conflict, also specifically described how their experiences of detention and torture 
inhibited their access to education and lamented their exclusion from the scholarship provision 
and access to medical treatment. 
Sexual violence that occurred during Nepal’s armed conflict is argued to be vastly 
underreported due to the fear of stigmatization, retribution, and complete lack of options for 
redress (Human Rights Watch 2004; OHCHR Report 2012). I decided not to interview victims of 
sexual violence due to the possibility of increasing their stigmatization within their families and 
communities. While a small percentage of Nepali women are publically outspoken about their 
experiences of sexual violence during the armed conflict, others have been ostracized by their 
husbands and in-laws after reporting their experiences to non-governmental organizations and 
international non-governmental organizations leaving them without basic resources, such as food 
and shelter. I also chose not to ask questions about sexual violence during interviews with 
conflict victims, but some interviewees mentioned their knowledge of other people’s 
experiences. Without asking follow up questions, I listened to them speak about sexual violence 
that occurred during Nepal’s armed conflict. Prabal, a Tharu male interviewee who was living in 
a rural village in Bardiya whose father was disappeared by the Nepal Army during the armed 
conflict said, 
During the conflict period, the Nepal Army was involved in the rape of different sisters in 
the village and even though they had no wish, they were involved in sexual violence. 
Generally the female sisters, they tell the truth to their close ones only. There is no 
mechanism to help them. When they try to talk about sexual violence, members of 
society will tease them...[and] think they can be treated badly. This is the reason why 
their dignity in society has been lowered…So, the girls which were subjected to rape and 
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sexual violence have not been able to say what they have been through, because they 
think it will be a shame for them in the society. The government should make necessary 
mechanisms [so they can receive financial relief and] the culprit brought under the 
boundary of the crime (the perpetrator should be prosecuted). 
 
As stated by Prabal, the experience of sexual violence continued to be associated with the 
loss of dignity. Interviewees also mentioned the loss of dignity associated with their experiences 
of torture, conscription as child soldiers, and the killing and disappearance of their parents. Many 
interviewees felt as if the Government of Nepal, including the Maoist party, should publically 
acknowledge victims’ dignity through various mechanisms. In conversations with people outside 
the Tharu community, conflict victims in Bardiya continue to be associated with Maoism and/or 
terrorism rather than being acknowledged as having experienced an undeserved violation of 
international law and personal dignity. For victims from the Tharu community, they are then 
doubly stigmatized. Formal acknowledgement of state responsibility as envisioned through 
formal reparations processes were thus important to victims who felt as if their dignity had been 
lost. Till now, all reported victims of sexual violence during the armed conflict are female. 
According to reports released by the UN, non-governmental organizations, and international 
non-governmental organizations, state security forces frequently subjected girls and women to 
sexual violence during the armed conflict; rape was common when searching for Maoists and to 
punish female Maoist cadres and sympathizers (Across the Lines; IHRICON 2007; OHCHR 
Report 2012). Women who lived close to army barracks or perceived Maoist strongholds were at 
a greater risk (Ibid). Children (i.e. girls younger than 18) were particularly vulnerable to sexual 
violence during the armed conflict. More than one third of reported victims of sexual violence 
during Nepal’s armed conflict were younger than 18 and many of those were younger than 15 
years old (OHCHR Report 2012; Transitional Justice Resource Archive Nepal).  
Even if children were recognized as “conflict victims” through the Interim Relief 
Program and qualified for the scholarship program, scholarships were only available for up to 
three children per family. This left families in a position where they had to choose which of their 
children to send to school. Given the economic situation of many victims in Bardiya, parents 
were already faced with this choice. In this economic situation, girl children are often the ones 
excluded from education. As Dhriti, a female interviewee, stated, “since my economic condition 
is very pathetic, my mom has to decide to whom I should teach, to whom I should educate, to my 
daughter or to my son?” Despite many parents’ desires to educate their daughters, males are 
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typically given priority if resources are limited. The limit on the number of children per family 
who could receive the scholarship prevented families facing an even greater lack of resources 
from the possibility of educating all their children and was especially exclusionary to girls. Girls 
in Nepal already face barriers to complete higher education, particularly girls from rural villages 
who are poor. When those conditions are compounded by the experience of the death or 
disappearance of their father, accessing education and resources were more difficult.  
Rather than redressing the violations they endured or addressing the ongoing exclusion 
that children from marginalized groups face accessing education, the relief program entrenched 
their exclusion through the denial of scholarships to children who endured sexual violence or 
torture, lived in rural areas, were poor, were from “lower” caste and ethnic groups, and those 
without access to power or assistance to secure the scholarships in time. 
Barriers to Continuing Education After Conflict 
Students who were able to overcome the barriers to access were faced with difficulty in 
maintaining the scholarship. Many of my interviewees who received the scholarship were unable 
to maintain it due to the difficulties they faced as a result of the conflict. In addition to the age 
limit of 18, scholarship guidelines include a provision to discontinue the scholarship for lack of 
attendance or performance. Poor children who lost their parent during the conflict had additional 
household duties, including caring for their siblings, agricultural work, and were often required 
to work in wage labor. For some conflict-affected children whose families had greater access to 
resources, the scholarship allowed them to attend boarding school where they could focus on 
their studies. Yet, other interviewees’ economic situation required them to work so they could 
provide for their families. Poor children whose father was killed or disappeared, along with their 
mothers, also faced stigmatization within their villages, schools, and families. Their 
stigmatization made access to housing, food, and education more difficult.  
Interviewees in Bardiya who lost the scholarship due to lack of attendance also cited 
personal illness as a reason why they could not attend school regularly. In many villages in 
Bardiya, access to medical treatment is limited. Those who did not meet the attendance 
requirements or failed a class lost the scholarship and were henceforth excluded from the 
program.  
Further, the scholarships did not provide the full amount of money needed for poor 
children to attend public school. Although there are no public school tuition fees in Nepal, 
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families needed sufficient resources to lose the labor of their children and were also required to 
provide money for their school supplies. Without the income of a father, this was a very difficult 
task for some. Not only the scholarship program, but also many aspects of Nepal’s education 
system serve to entrench inequality. Tuition classes (private tutoring) are required for most 
children to pass their classes. This creates an additional barrier to families without the financial 
means to provide such resources to their children. Of the very few poor children in Bardiya 
affected by conflict whose families had access to the resources to help them complete class 10, 
they were then faced with passing the School Leaving Certificate (SLC), also known as the “iron 
gate” in Nepal. As Mani, a male interviewee who was arrested and tortured by state security 
forces when he was approximately 13 years of age, explained,  
The condition of our house was so that we didn’t have enough food to eat. We didn’t 
have enough money for medical care if we got sick. While I was studying, I had to go to 
work in the field two to four days per week. With the money I earned, I used to pay my 
school fees and buy my notebooks and pens. By doing that I studied up to class 10, but I 
could not pass the SLC. I could not complete my SLC because of the condition of the 
house…if there was money, I could read and my parents could educate me. 
 
Students in Nepal who do not pass the SLC are not able to complete their studies beyond 
class 10. Families with resources can send their children to private school where they have a 
much greater chance of passing the SLC, learning English, going on complete classes 11 and 12, 
and then studying at the bachelor’s level. According to the District Education Office in Bardiya, 
the current SLC pass rate for children attending public schools is 22% while children in private 
schools have an 85% pass rate. Additionally, families with greater access to resources can ensure 
that their children study subjects that will ensure their viability in the job market to secure higher 
paying jobs. For those who cannot secure employment within Nepal, higher education 
determines in which country they will work as well as their working conditions. Educated 
graduates who speak English are more likely to secure employment in safer jobs abroad. Nepalis 
who are less educated are more likely to work in unskilled or semiskilled labor positions often in 
dangerous working conditions in Qatar, India, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and other 
countries. The scholarship program did not provide enough money for children to attend public 
school let alone private school making it very difficult for poor conflict affected families to 
educate their children. Interviewees expressed a desire for higher education, as it was perceived 
to be a means to access jobs that would provide sufficient resources for their families’ survival. 
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The scholarship guidelines have prevented many who experienced gross violations of human 
rights during Nepal’s armed conflict from receiving scholarships through the relief program and 
thus excluded them from the possibility of education. 
Interviews with people who experienced gross violations of human rights as children in 
Bardiya revealed that one of the only semblances of a state-led mechanism of transitional justice 
had failed to provide them with a sense of justice. One female interviewee explained, 
These days even when transportation vehicles kill chickens, then they get [financial] 
relief. There is justice. So, here is the case of murder [of my father]. Then we should not 
get anything? They get justice. We are not getting justice. The children of Army get 
justice when anything happens. If they die or commit suicide, arrangements are made for 
food, shelter, and clothes. For us, there is nothing.  
 
In Bardiya, interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with mechanisms of transitional justice 
and their ongoing distrust in the Nepali government. Given that many of them experienced a 
gross violation of human rights at the hands of a member of the Nepal Police or Army, this is not 
surprising. Children whose parents were disappeared or killed during the armed conflict were 
given differential access to the scholarship provision and children who were raped, tortured, or 
conscripted as soldiers were excluded completely. In Bardiya, interviewees’ perceptions of the 
national government and the scholarship program were overwhelmingly negative. The following 
quotes are all from male and female interviewees residing in Bardiya whose fathers had been 
forcibly disappeared by state security forces: 
If we see in Bardiya, the conflict victim children are not much educated. This is because 
families do not have the resources to educate their children. The government has given 
this scholarship just so it appears that something has been given. If the government 
wanted to do something for the conflict victims, then it would not have prescribed the age 
[of 18]. 
 
Whoever goes to the government, before they go to the government, they say ‘we will do 
something for you,’ but after they reach to the government, they do not do anything. And 
now it’s been 13 years and all the big political parties have reached the government but 
have not done anything till today. At one time we felt maybe the Maoist party will do 
something for us, but they have not done anything after they went to the government. 
 
What to say about the national government? In Nepal, the leaders change time and again. 
They talk a lot but do nothing. They will help to their own relatives only. That much. 
They do not do anything. They do only corruption. More than corruption, they corrupt 
people, their thoughts, money, and many things. 
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The scholarship program in Nepal has failed to provide conflict victims with a sense of 
justice and redress. Further, it has served to entrench inequality and perpetuate distrust in the 
Nepali government. Every conflict victim I interviewed in Nepal, regardless of their access to 
education or region of residence, expressed distrust in the national government and commonly 
cited systemic exclusion, nepotism, and corruption as the sources of their distrust.  
Conclusion  
During Nepal’s armed conflict, schools were commonly sites of violence and the Maoists 
specifically targeted private schools as a tactic to highlight how the privatization of education 
reinforced exclusion and inequality. Yet, ten years of armed conflict failed to ensure 
marginalized groups’ equal access to educational opportunities. Although the state implemented 
scholarships for some “conflict affected children,” the scholarship provision through the Interim 
Relief Program was designed and implemented to ensure the exclusion of poor rural victims 
from historically marginalized groups. In Nepal, access to formal education continues to be a 
marker of status and hierarchy. While systemic barriers to education remain, the inability of poor 
parents to educate their children, ironically, is associated by some government officials with their 
not knowing the value of education, as illustrated by Balkrishna’s quote in the introduction to 
this chapter, and discourses of knowing/not knowing are utilized to obscure attention to power 
differentials. Meanwhile, poor parents often described to me their willingness to do everything 
possible, including taking out loans, to educate their children. Education continues to be 
understood as a means to overcome inequitable structures of power and obtain dignity. However, 
the barriers conflict victims in Bardiya experience trying to access scholarships demonstrate not 
only that structural inequality still exists during the “transitional” period, but also that the state is 
committed to maintaining it. As one interviewee stated, “To date, the government is of no use, 
but let’s hope for better.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   72 
Chapter 6 
The Performance of Inclusion and Exclusionary Truth 
 
“The political parties picked us to be on the commission.” I was sitting across from 
Dhanvi, the only member from the Dalit community on Nepal’s truth commission. I was 
perplexed that she said this to me. I hadn’t yet asked her a question. I had only just introduced 
myself as a Ph.D. student conducting research and sat down in her office after being asked by 
Akash, another member of the commission I had scheduled to interview, to wait there.  
Although it was well known that the members of both truth commissions were politically 
appointed (and it was publicized in newspapers and openly criticized by the UN, victim-activists, 
staff from non-governmental organizations, donors, and diplomats), it was also a taboo and 
contested subject among the members of the commissions and the Nepal government. The 
commissions were meant to be neutral fact-finding bodies that would, among other tasks, 
“investigate incidents of gross violations of human rights, find out and record the truth and 
[publicize] it” (www.trc.gov.np/about-us).  
Akash entered the room and sat down to my right in a black leather chair, identical to the 
one I sat in, while Dhanvi stayed seated in her office chair behind her desk to my left as she was 
reading the newspaper. My interview with Akash then focused on the complaint-taking process. 
Both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on 
Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) were in the process of accepting “complaints” related to 
the armed conflict. During the interview, Akash asked to take a short break and left me in the 
room with Dhanvi who again began offering information. Speaking about the Dalit community 
in Nepal, she said, “They are uneducated and backward. They don’t have jobs.” When explaining 
how she became educated, she said, “I worked hard.” Although I completed my interview with 
Akash, it was Dhanvi’s brief comments that day that left me thinking about the performance of 
inclusion in Nepal.  
Dhanvi’s seat on the commission was presented as a symbol of inclusion and 
representation of the Dalit community. However, despite the inclusion of a member of the Dalit 
community on the commission, Dhanvi stated clearly that she holds her seat because she was 
appointed by a political party to represent their interests throughout the state-led truth-seeking 
processes. In her comments, she also held up the myth of meritocracy-working hard as a means 
for achieving upward mobility-without mentioning how systems of inequality and nepotism 
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prevent people from gaining access to jobs, particularly in government-appointed positions, and 
in lucrative positions at the UN, international non-governmental organizations, and non-
governmental organizations. It seemed to me that Dhanvi had failed to differentiate between 
kinds of “hard work” that are politically and economically rewarded and those that manifest as 
systems of slavery (e.g. kamaiya8 labor). Her presence on the commission also struck me as more 
like a performance (than a representation) of inclusion.  
I soon began to notice that these patterns-or performances, as I call them-of inclusion 
extended to other groups as well. Boldly, while sitting next to two male commission members, a 
female commission member named Maya said,  
Women are not a priority. They are a priority in name only. The policies call for the 
inclusion of women, children, and the elderly. There is no such special provision to take 
complaints from women…I am a woman on the commission and most of the other 
members are male. I do not have an equal voice on the commission. 
 
The state policy that established the truth commissions stipulates that at least one woman serve 
on each commission. Once established, there were two female members on the TRC and one 
female member on the CIEDP.  
My conversations with Dhanvi and Maya illustrate how inclusion is both performed and 
politicized in state-led truth commissions implemented as mechanisms of transitional justice in 
Nepal. Likewise, the inclusion of children in “complaint-taking” processes is stipulated in the 
policies that established the commissions and mandated their work. In this chapter, based on 
observations of Nepal’s truth-seeking processes as well as interviews and conversations with 
victims and facilitators, I examine how the state performs inclusion and question what political 
work is done through this façade. I argue the performance of the inclusion of “children” and 
historically excluded groups in truth-seeking processes serve to maintain exclusionary power 
structures.  
 																																																								
8 Within the kamaiya labor system, landlords tie entire families to systems of debt bondage from 
which they can rarely escape. Kamaiya laborers are agriculturalists from the Tharu community 
and are typically not allotted sufficient means to sustain their livelihood, consistently placing 
them and their family members in greater debt. Although outlawed, many families continue to be 
systemically prevented from escaping the consequences of generations of exploitive labor 
practices and still consider themselves kamaiya as they are working for exploitative landlords 
despite legal protections. Tharu resistance to their exploitation by landlords has continually been 
curtailed by state violence. Also see Chapter 3 in this dissertation. 
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Truth-Seeking Commissions 
Truth-seeking commissions, typically formed after an armed conflict, are temporary 
bodies created to establish a truthful historical record, formally acknowledge past human rights 
violations, promote reconciliation, identify perpetrators and the whereabouts of the disappeared, 
recommend reparations and reforms, and address the needs of victims. Between 1983 and 2010, 
more than 40 truth commissions were established globally (Hayner 2011). Early scholarly 
debates on transitional justice often centered on the utility of trials as opposed to truth-seeking 
mechanisms as a means to establish justice. Within this debate, truth-seeking commissions are 
understood to be more attentive to victims’ needs than punitive measures by focusing on their 
stories, making the public aware of their suffering, and recommending reparations (Hayner 2011; 
Minnow 1998). Further, truth commissions are argued to strengthen democratic processes and 
rebuild trust between citizens and the state (see e.g. Freeman and Hayner 2003).  
Nepal’s peace agreement stipulated that a “High-level Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission” be established to “probe into those involved in serious violation[s] of human rights 
and crime[s] against humanity [during] the armed conflict for creating an atmosphere for 
reconciliation in the society” and stipulated that the names and addresses of the people who were 
disappeared or killed during the conflict be made public within 60 days (CPA 2006). More than 
eight years after the signing of the peace agreement, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
a Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons, were finally established in 
February 2015.  
Anthropologists examining transitional justice have illuminated the importance of 
understanding “local justice,” or the ways in which justice is produced, experienced, and 
perceived in specific localities (Burnet 2008; Clark 2009; Drexler 2006; Hinton 2011; Robben 
2011; Sanford 2003; Shaw 2007, 2011; Theidon 2007; Wagner 2008; Wilson 2001). Scholars 
have given particular attention how transitional justice mechanisms, including truth-seeking 
commissions, are implemented in ways that are considered “top-down” or exclusionary towards 
victims’ needs (Laplante and Theidon 2007; Lundy and McGovern 2008; McEvoy and 
McGregor 2008; Shaw 2007). Dragovic-Soso (2016) argues a principal reason for the failure of 
the truth commission in Bosnia was the lack of legitimacy among victims’ associations who 
perceived the commission as elitist and exclusionary. Likewise, Robins (2011, 2012) argues that 
transitional justice in Nepal has been an elite-driven process that has ignored victims’ needs. As 
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a result of these findings, scholars and activists have called for a more victim-centric transitional 
justice in Nepal where victims are engaged in the process rather than dependent on national and 
international agencies to speak on their behalf (Robins and Bhandari 2012).  
Other researchers, however, identify the benefits of truth-seeking processes. Sanford 
(2003), in her research on Guatemala, argues that truth-seeking aids in healing and provides the 
foundation for rebuilding democracy, justice, and trust. Burnet (2008) contends knowing the 
details of their loved ones’ deaths during the genocide in Rwanda was not only a political 
necessity but a spiritual need for survivors. Yet, she also draws attention to how the gacaca court 
system, implemented to end impunity, promote reconciliation, and reveal the truth, has led to the 
repatriation of remains for some families while other victims have been excluded from 
knowledge of their loved ones’ fate and whereabouts (Ibid).  
Overall, however, given national and international political influences on processes of 
transitional justice, scholars have challenged the utility of truth commissions to achieve their 
desired outcomes of helping victims to heal, promoting accountability and reconciliation, and 
establishing an authoritative record (Daly 2008; Mendeloff 2004; Sundar 2004) and called for 
greater attention to how truth-seeking commissions can be politicized and polarizing (e.g. Issacs 
2010). Further, they have questioned what kinds of knowledge can be produced through truth 
commissions (Coxshall 2005) and challenged assumptions that truth that can be independent 
from state power (Thomson 2000). Others have argued the political conditions in which truth-
seeking commissions operate (Quinn 2004), the choice of members of the commissions, and how 
they discover and present their findings can determine what kind of knowledge is produced 
(Chapman and Ball 2001). Wilson (2001), in his examination of the truth and reconciliation 
commission in South Africa, argues that victims’ needs were secondary to rebuilding the post-
apartheid state and political elites inserted notions of justice that were not satisfactory for many 
victims. Millar (2010) contends the educated elite minority had divergent experiences and 
perspectives of the TRC in Sierra Leone compared to the non-elite majority. He argues that 
members of the elite, with greater access to resources and power, were more likely to be in a 
position to take advantage of the large amount of funding for peacebuilding after the war and feel 
as if the TRC helped them while non-elite interviewees expressed negative attitudes about their 
experiences of the TRC (Ibid).  
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Children’s Inclusion in Truth-Seeking 
While children are argued to be uniquely vulnerable during armed conflict (Aptel 2012; 
Ni Aolain 2007; Machel 1996; Ramirez-Barat 2012; UN 1325; UN Approach to Transitional 
Justice), truth-seeking commissions have not consistently focused on children’s experiences or 
their inclusion. However, as international attention surrounding child soldiers increased, such as 
in Sierra Leone, so did the performance of their inclusion in truth-seeking processes. Although 
the truth commission in Sierra Leone (2004) was the first to explicitly mention children in its 
mandate, involve children in statement taking, and publish a child-friendly version of its final 
report, violations against children were documented by earlier truth-seeking commissions in 
Chile (1991), El Salvador (1993), South Africa (2002), Haiti (1996), and Guatemala (1999). 
Perhaps following the lead of Sierra Leone, the final reports of the truth commissions in Peru 
(2003), Liberia (2009), and Timor Leste (2005) included chapters focused on children, and the 
truth commissions in South Africa, Liberia, and Timor-Leste facilitated public hearings for 
children. The Liberian TRC included children throughout the process by training statement-
takers to work with children, hosting TRC awareness-raising workshops for children, holding 
children’s hearings and panels, and exhibiting children’s art and writings about their experiences 
of war (Sowa 2010). However, definitions of “children” are not applied consistently in the 
inclusion of children in truth-seeking commissions. For example, the commission in Liberia 
decided “children” only included people who were 18 or younger during the work of the TRC 
(Sowa 2010) while the South African TRC refused to accept statements or testimonies from 
people younger than 18 (Pigou 2010).  
Scholars examining children’s inclusion and participation in truth-seeking commissions 
have argued for greater attention to structures of power and inequality (Pigou 2010) and 
highlighted children’s emphases on educational opportunities, sustainable livelihood, safe 
drinking water, and the construction of hospitals (Sowa 2010). Cook and Heykoop (2010), based 
on their research in Sierra Leone, contend children are more likely to report positive experiences 
with commissions if they are provided economic, social, and emotional support. Without such 
support, children’s statement-taking experiences can increase their vulnerability and children 
may feel as if their statement-giving experiences were alienating and useless (Ibid). They argue 
that children’s basic economic, education, and protection needs should be linked to truth-telling 
processes and advocate for poverty reduction and children’s long-term emotional, 
   77 
developmental, and material support (Ibid: 190). Cook and Heykoop’s (2010) findings suggest 
that children’s inclusion in truth-seeking often serves as a performance to conceal global and 
national systems of inequality. This is particularly illuminated when children, as in Sierra Leone, 
request access to safe drinking water, health, education, and sustainable livelihoods and the truth 
commission produces a child-friendly version of its report to symbolize their inclusion rather 
than addressing their stated priorities.  
Likewise, in Nepal, the inclusion of children’s voices regarding truth-seeking processes 
was symbolized even before the establishment of the commissions, but their opinions were 
disregarded. For example, in 2008, when Nepali children (people younger than 18 years of age at 
the time) were invited to participate in a workshop on children and transitional justice, they 
expressed their opposition to a truth commission established and supported by national political 
actors (Siegrist 2010). Children explicitly stated they didn’t want the “truth” utilized for political 
purposes (Ibid). Their input was ignored, and seven years later two state-led truth-seeking 
commissions were established in Nepal. 
Policies “for Truth” 
Many victims who were younger than 18 during the armed conflict had aged out of the 
internationally defined category of “childhood” during Nepal’s transitional period. Thus, I was 
struck by the inclusion of special provisions for “children” in both the Enforced Disappearances 
Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2014 (TRC Act), which established the 
commissions, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Rules, 2016 (TRC Rules), which 
stipulated the truth commission’s activities. A definition of “children” was not included in either 
document and no clarification was provided to explain why victims’ categorization as children 
might require special provisions. Consistent with most transitional justice policies focusing on 
children, neither the TRC Act nor the TRC Rules included acknowledgement of the systemic 
discrimination or inequality experienced by children from historically marginalized groups. Also 
noticeably absent was any explanation of how their positionality contributed to their 
vulnerability during the armed conflict. Regarding special provisions for children, the TRC Act 
(2014:15) states, 
The Commission may make a separate arrangement as prescribed for facilitation of 
children, senior citizens, person[s] with disabilit[ies] and person[s] subjected to sexual 
violence in the act of filing a complaint with the Commission…[and] in the act of making 
a statement or testimony.  
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Throughout the TRC Rules, “children” are assumed to especially need psychological 
support and are conflated with senior citizens, people with disabilities, and people who 
experienced sexual violence. Yet, their need for special provisions and preference as children is 
not explained. In the TRC Codes of Conduct, discrimination is prohibited at an individual level. 
Yet, the written policies of Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions do not indicate if or how victims 
of the armed conflict might experience processes of transitional justice differently due to 
systemic discrimination and inequality. Likewise, “children” are written in both the TRC Act and 
Rules as static, universal, and homogenous. In semi-structured interviews with members of the 
commissions involved in the complaint-taking process, the definitions of “children” they used 
were inconsistent, and they did not consistently clarify the reasons why children needed special 
protection or priority. Some members of the commissions argued that “children,” as defined in 
the TRC Act and Rules, referred to victims who were younger than a certain age during the 
conflict while others argued “children” meant victims who were younger than a certain age at the 
time they filed a complaint. Although members of both commissions were aware that a child is 
defined as younger than 18 according to international law, they sometimes also referred to 
children as younger than 16, as codified in Nepal’s domestic law.  
During my last visit to the CIEDP for updates, a commission member named Satindra 
described to me how the commission would prioritize “children” who were disappeared during 
the armed conflict. When I first arrived, he said they had received 112 applications about people 
who were disappeared when they were children, defined as below the age of 16. Satindra stated, 
“we will give priority to children, senior citizens, and women and then to ordinary people.” Here, 
he explained senior citizens were defined as more than 50 years old. Satindra thus qualified men 
between the ages of 17 and 50 as “ordinary” while children, senior citizens, and women were 
presented as outside the category of “ordinary people.” The specific definitions and prioritization 
of these groups is particularly odd considering that it was men who were overwhelmingly 
disappeared during the armed conflict (more than 90%) leaving living family members that have 
unique needs due to their age and gender.  
Further, these particular prioritizations divert attention away from why people from 
certain groups were forcibly disappeared during the armed conflict. In Bardiya, for example, 
every woman and child who was disappeared was from the Tharu community. Later, during the 
same conversation, he said, “women, children, and elderly people are in priority. Hearings can be 
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confidential for these groups. For women, people from the same gender can be involved.” I 
asked, “what does ‘children’ mean?” He said, “per Nepali law, under 18.” (Nepali domestic law 
lists children as younger than 16 years of age). I asked, “now or during the conflict?” “It can be 
both,” he replied. “What does senior citizens mean?” I inquired. “For me,” he said, “60 plus.” 
When I arrived, Satindra had defined children as younger than 16 and later as younger than 18. 
This was one of many interviews with members of both commissions where they defined 
children (and, in this interview, also senior citizens) differently even in the same conversation. 
Shore and Wright argue anthropologists can read policies in a number of ways, including 
“as narratives that serve to justify or condemn the present, or as rhetorical devices and discursive 
formations that function to empower some people and silence others” (1997:7). Thus, despite the 
outward signs of inclusion and prioritization of certain vulnerable groups, the policies regarding 
state-led truth commissions, and the lack of consistent and clear criteria by which to define those 
groups, actually reflects the political and economic exclusion of the majority of Nepal’s 
population and silences poor, rural, conflict victims from marginalized communities. The TRC 
policies also conceal the political work of the state-led truth commissions in Nepal, which 
national leaders have controlled to obscure their complicity in gross violations of human rights 
that occurred during the armed conflict.  
The Politicization of the Commissions and the Inclusion of “Children” 
The amount of time that passed between the signing of the peace agreement in 2006 and 
the establishment of the commissions, the political appointments of members of both 
commissions, and the amnesty provisions for accused perpetrators were all ongoing sources of 
contention during the transitional period. Since the cessation of armed conflict in Nepal, 
prominent human rights/transitional justice organizations, diplomats, donors, and the UN have 
prioritized prosecutions as a necessary mechanism of transitional justice (Robins 2011, 2012, 
2013; Sajjad 2013). Yet, many accused perpetrators of conflict-era rights violations have secured 
positions in the highest levels of the Nepali government. Thus, as is the case in many countries 
(e.g. Drexler 2010; Finnstrom 2010; Robben 2013; Ross 2010; Waldorf 2010; Wilson 2001), 
powerful national leaders in the Nepali government have insisted on amnesty as a means to 
maintain peace in response to human rights organizations’ and the UN’s insistence on 
prosecutions for war crimes. This debate, along with ongoing political instability, contributed to 
the postponement of the truth commissions and inevitably led to political work to conceal, rather 
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than reveal, victims’ experiences. In interviews with members of both commissions, they stated 
that they had drafted the rules and codes of conduct and subsequently powerful government 
officials amended the commissions’ policies to ensure their own protection from prosecution. 
Further, the inclusion of “children” in Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions was politicized 
due to the issue of child soldiers. Following the armed conflict, the United Nations Mission in 
Nepal (UNMIN) facilitated a reintegration program of former Maoist combatants into the Nepal 
Army. Of those registered through UNMIN, 4,009 were disqualified from reintegration due to 
their status as minors (defined as younger than 18 years of age) or late recruits (2,974 minors and 
1,035 late recruits) (Robins, et al. 2016). Stigmatized as “disqualified,” they were given 22,000 
rupees (approximately $285) and prevented from joining the Nepal Army. For ex-combatants 
who were not disqualified, they were given the option of being integrated into the Nepal Army or 
receiving cash payments depending on their rank. Approximately 3,200 chose to be integrated 
into the Nepal Army and 16,000 received a cash payment between 500,000 rupees and 900,000 
rupees (approximately $6,200-$9,300) (Ibid). Thus, their age-the determinant of their having 
endured a gross violation of human rights and what makes their recruitment a war crime-has 
prevented them from receiving equal financial compensation in the reintegration program. 
Although some received counseling and/or vocational training, many former child soldiers are 
dissatisfied with their treatment during Nepal’s transitional period (Robins, et al. 2016). Due to 
their frustration with former child soldiers’ exclusion from integration and the 2008 Interim 
Relief Program (discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation), victim-activists have advocated for 
their inclusion in truth-seeking processes. Yet, during the complaint-taking period, members of 
the TRC publically disagreed on whether child soldiers should be included.  
Just after the 90-day deadline to file complaints had passed in July 2016, I met with a 
TRC commission member, Ankit, in his office. I arrived a few minutes after 10:00 a.m. when the 
office opened. As I walked in, he was sitting behind his desk, and while I sat down across from 
him, he asked a young man to bring the newspaper and black tea. This was our second time 
meeting in his office, and one of the first things he said to me was, “I feel alienated from the 
other members of the commission.” I asked him to explain the challenges he was facing. He 
responded by saying: 
I have tried to bring up issues related to child soldiers, but the chair of the commission 
refused to address these issues or add them to the meeting agenda. [Two other members 
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of the commission] strongly requested that those issues not be brought up in our meeting. 
The issues I’m raising are challenging but important. 
 
These debates among members of the commission were made public on social media and 
through national newspapers where commission members expressed their opinions on the 
inclusion of former child soldiers in truth seeking processes. Thus, within these debates, 
“children” referred to people who were now older than 18 years of age but had joined the 
Maoists as combatants when they were younger than 15 years of age. Politicians and victim-
activists in Nepal were well aware of the prosecutions of leaders in other countries due to their 
utilization of child soldiers during armed conflict. So, debates around the inclusion of children, 
like most of the debates surrounding transitional justice in Nepal, became consumed by powerful 
political leaders’ escape from prosecution for war crimes rather than focused on the inclusion of 
victims in processes that would provide them with other forms of redress, such as greater access 
to sustainable livelihoods. The TRC officially announced in August 2016 that the use of child 
soldiers during the armed conflict would be put on hold without further consideration. The 
official reasoning behind this decision was that the use of child soldiers was viewed as a rights 
violation within the Maoist party, and should thus be handled within the party. In November 
2016, the Supreme Court ordered Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions to investigate all filed 
complaints.  
What Children? 
Although children were explicitly included in both the TRC Act and Rules, staff 
members at the LPC office in Bardiya reported that no children filed complaints with their office. 
Likewise, staff at the Women and Children’s Office in Bardiya reported they had not received 
any complaints from children. At the TRC and CIEDP offices in Kathmandu, members of the 
commissions reported they were unaware of any children filing complaints. However, some 
members also stated they had not yet compiled data on the age of people who had filed 
complaints. One prominent member of a local victims’ organization in Bardiya said he assisted 
two children (both younger than 18 years of age) who were orphans to file complaints regarding 
the disappearance of their fathers. In practice, neither special accommodations nor priority were 
given to victims who were, according to international law or Nepali domestic law, children 
during the armed conflict or during the complaint-taking period.  
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Coming back to the interview with TRC commission member Ankit: after the initial 
complaint taking process had ended, I asked him about the inclusion of children. He said, “there 
was no one available to take complaints from women and children...and no extensive training 
was provided to deal with children and women or even emotional men.” Here women, children, 
and emotional men are conflated and the reason for special training on how to deal with children 
is framed as necessary because they would be more “emotional.” Throughout my time in Nepal, 
commission members never came to a consensus on what was meant by the word “children” in 
the policies mandating their work. 
Children who were Tortured during Nepal’s Armed Conflict and Continued Exclusion 
Although the members of Nepal’s truth commissions had divergent and inconsistent 
definitions of “children,” children are defined in international law, the basis of transitional justice 
processes, as younger than 18 years of age. State security forces did not distinguish people as 
“children” nor exclude them from torture when they were seeking information about Maoists 
during the armed conflict. Torture is listed in TRC policies as a gross violation of human rights, 
and therefore, incidents of torture were to be included in the “complaint-taking” process by the 
TRC. Further, the TRC Rules stipulate that victims of torture be included in the commission 
members’ recommendations for “compensation, facilities or concessions for victims.” Yet, 
victims’ experiences of access to state-led mechanisms of transitional justice were divergent 
depending on their positionality. Victims’ differential experiences mimicked historical patterns 
of the exclusion of certain caste and ethnic groups and poor Nepalis living in rural areas. In this 
section, I examine the experiences and perceptions of two males who were tortured by Nepal’s 
state security forces when they were younger than 18 and focus on their divergent experiences of 
access to Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions. 
Priya introduced me to Kumar. Kumar, a member of the Tharu community, works as a 
kamaiya9 laborer and lives in a rural village in Bardiya with his family. Priya, a young Tharu 
female living in the same village whose father was killed during the armed conflict, suggested I 
speak with Kumar and invited him to meet me at her home. We sat down in a back room where 
Priya’s mother was preparing tea. After offering us all tea, she and Priya left the room. As I sat 
across from Kumar, who was arrested by state security forces when he was 17 years old, he 
explained that for him 																																																								
9 See footnote 5 on page 72. 
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life is about learning how to be and living as kamaiya. Since my childhood, I have been 
working in other’s field, and, even today, it has been continuing. From the date I started 
knowing things, I am kamaiya. We hoped our lives would change if we could buy some 
land, but we cannot. We even don’t have land to build a house. While working as 
kamaiya, [the armed conflict started], and then the army took me from my home. When I 
was taken, my elder brother’s wife was beaten. After I was taken, they locked me up. I 
was detained for nine months. I was beaten for four hours in the morning and four hours 
in the evening. I was beaten, and my life passed for nine months. They beat me and asked 
whether I was involved in the Maoists or not. I was beaten from my backbone to my legs. 
Except my head, they beat me everywhere. We were forced to stay in a dark room, the 
same room where we urinated and excreted. We never knew when it was day and when it 
was night. I was beaten every evening and also beaten while eating my food. This is how 
nine months passed. When ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] used to 
visit there, we were all hidden. We could not go out. They [army and police were used 
synonymously throughout the interview to refer to who arrested, detained, and tortured 
Kumar] dug a big hole in the jungle, and we were kept there with our hands tied day and 
night. My nine months passed that way, and when I was taken back home, [the Army] 
said [to my family] that I was only taken for questioning and sent back to home. When I 
arrived home, my family said they had already conducted a funeral ceremony for me 
thinking I had been killed. I was severely beaten. I had pain in my backbone. I could not 
walk. And what else to say? Now, still I have pain in my backbone that sometimes 
increases severely. When my brother searched for me, he was also beaten. 
 
While Kumar may have sympathized with or even supported the Maoists, particularly given their 
stated opposition to exploitative labor practices, his positionality alone as a young kamaiya 
laborer from the Tharu community in a rural village in Bardiya increased his risk of arrest and 
torture by the Nepal Army. I met many members of the Tharu community who spoke of their 
torture as children by state forces during Nepal’s armed conflict. 
Although the state specifically targeted Nepalis based on their membership in a particular 
caste or ethnic group, if someone was suspected of being a Maoist, their “high” caste status alone 
did not shield them from state violence. I met Anil through a prominent activist for victims’ 
rights in Nepal who was detained and tortured alongside him during the armed conflict. 
Members of the Nepal Army arrested Anil, a “high” caste male, when he was 16 years old, and 
he was subsequently detained at an army barracks in Kathmandu. As I sat across from him, Anil 
described how he was playing with his friends when a van pulled up, men jumped out, grabbed 
and blindfolded him, and drove away. At 16 years of age, when he was taken, he said that he had 
no connection to the Maoist party nor was he aware of their ideologies. Anil believed he was 
arrested because his brother’s friend, who was also arrested, said Anil’s name while being 
tortured by the Nepal Army. Despite Anil’s lack of any connection to the Maoists, he was 
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abducted, tortured, and detained for 18 months in the barracks. He described to me how, for 18 
months, he was constantly blindfolded and his hands were tied. He held his hands together in 
front of his body while saying “in the morning” and then held his hands behind his back saying 
“at night.” He and other prisoners at the barracks were not allowed to use a toilet leaving them 
no choice but to sit in their own excrement.  
Among Anil’s most debilitating physical consequence as a result of his torture is kidney 
damage. He said a physician told him the kidney damage was likely due to his attempts to not 
urinate for 18 months. Anil described to me how he was questioned while he was hit 
“everywhere” repeatedly “by two or three people” with a plastic pipe and how his head was 
immersed in water. Then he offered me his hand to show me the scar from being shocked by an 
“electric stick” and explained how he was forced to sign a piece of paper formally admitting to 
being a terrorist. Anil also described being hidden by the Nepal Army during International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) inspections of the barracks but did not say he was forced 
into a hole in the ground with other detainees like Kumar described. As Nepal’s peace agreement 
was being signed, Anil said, a representative from Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) assisted in his release and rehabilitation.  
Anil reported his experiences to both the OHCHR and the National Human Rights 
Commission, and subsequently received 25,000 rupees (approximately $250) from the 
Government of Nepal. A representative of OHCHR also assisted in his arranging a temporary 
place to stay and medical treatment. Since Kumar’s release, he has not reported his experiences 
of torture to or received financial compensation or medical treatment from any UN organization, 
non-governmental organization, or the Government of Nepal.  
Torture victims were excluded from Nepal’s Interim Relief Program, regardless of their 
age at the time of the human rights violation. Anil was fortunate that some medical care and 
minimal compensation were provided for him. Further, Kumar’s family’s lack of access to 
resources has prevented his pursuit of medical treatment and forced his immediate reentry upon 
his release into an exploitative labor relationship with a landlord. Despite his physical pain since 
being tortured, Kumar continues to work as an agricultural laborer. Although his labor provides 
sufficient resources to sustain his family’s lives, they continue to be indebted to a landlord and 
all lack access to medical care and basic education. He expressed fear that his children would 
remain kamaiya laborers. It’s difficult for most Nepalis to find work, and Anil laments his 
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inability to provide for his family. He believes the consequences of his detention, specifically his 
disabilities and lack of education, make finding work more difficult. However, Anil described 
being fortunate that his natal family and his wife work to provide sufficient resources enabling 
him to live a somewhat more comfortable life than Kumar. Anil’s access to the knowledge of the 
OHCHR and the National Human Rights Commission allowed him to seek medical care and an 
extremely modest amount of compensation.  
Access to knowledge and resources in Nepal is linked to privilege and power. Those with 
privilege and power are better able to access knowledge and vice versa. Knowledge of how to 
negotiate with those in power has historically economically elevated members of marginalized 
communities, including the Tharu. At the same time, as discussed in the last chapter, members of 
the Tharu community often associate their ongoing marginalization and their families’ loss of 
land with their lack of formal education and the perceived trickery of people from other 
communities with greater connections to power. In Nepal, truth-seeking commissions, argued to 
be more victim-centric than prosecutions, have thus far prioritized some victims’ complaints to 
the exclusion of others. In 2008, knowledge of the truth-seeking commissions was 
directly proportional to educational status. People in the higher educational cluster are 
more likely to know about the TRC than are those who are illiterate or less educated, 
84% who had received a SLC had heard about the TRC as opposed to only 58% of the 
illiterate respondents (2008 Nepali Voices). 
 
In my own research, I found knowledge of the commissions much lower. In February 
2016, before the truth-seeking commissions began accepting complaints in Nepal, most of my 
interviewees in Bardiya who experienced a gross violation of human rights when they were 
younger than 18 years of age, including Kumar, had no knowledge of the TRC or CIEDP. 
Similar to the findings in Nepali Voices (2008), lack of knowledge of the commissions was 
correlated with educational status and, in addition, distance from the capital. However, those 
with connections to victims’ organizations in Bardiya, regardless of their educational status, had 
knowledge of the TRC and the CIEDP in February 2016. By the end of the complaint-taking 
period in July 2016, the TRC claimed they received 55,000 complaints (personal interview with 
member of the TRC) and the CIEDP claimed they received more than 2,800 complaints 
(personal interview with member of the CIEDP). Yet, in conversations and interviews with 
victims after the complaint-taking processes, many stated they did not fully understand the 
purpose of the commissions although they had been convinced to file a complaint. 
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 In the Kathmandu Valley, comprised of three districts, there were five offices where 
victims could file complaints: the national headquarters of the CIEDP, which only accepted 
complaints regarding disappearances during the armed conflict, the TRC, which accepted all 
conflict-era complaints other than disappearances, and three local peace committee offices. From 
the village where I was residing in a rural village in Bardiya, it took me seven hours by public 
transportation to reach the district headquarters of Gulariya where all victims in the district were 
required to travel to file a complaint at the local peace committee office. Because there were only 
two staff members in the local peace committee office accepting complaints, the local peace 
committee office in Gulariya was often full and required victims to wait to meet with a staff 
member. For victims without the access to resources to travel via motorbike or private car, it was 
difficult, if not impossible, to travel to the LPC office to file their complaint and return home on 
the same day. For victims already facing a lack of resources, the process was made more 
difficult. While public transportation costs are low in Nepal, for rural victims, many of whom are 
extremely poor, the cost of transportation combined with the loss of wages from taking the time 
to file a complaint, and the task of arranging a place to sleep before returning home via public 
transportation made filing a complaint extremely challenging.  
Literacy in rural areas is considerably lower than in Kathmandu, and Nepalis who are 
poor, from marginalized caste or ethnic groups, or women are far more likely to be illiterate 
(Bennett 2006; Guneratne 2002; Masklak 2003; Robins 2012; Subba, et al. 2014). In addition, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, attending school was made considerably more difficult by the armed 
conflict (Caddell 2007; OHCHR Report 2012; van Wessel and van Hirtum 2013). Because the 
process of filing complaints was written rather than oral, victims who were literate and had 
knowledge of the truth-seeking commissions did not require the assistance of a staff member. 
They could complete their forms independently and submit completed forms in an envelope 
allowing them greater confidentiality.  
Given that the truth commissions were implemented by the state, and the government 
officials accepting complaints were nationally appointed, unsurprisingly, many victims 
prioritized their confidentiality as a means to ensure their safety in rural areas. For victims who 
were illiterate, they were forced to rely on a staff member of a government-instituted 
commission to complete a form describing their experiences of human rights violations 
committed by people representing the Nepali government or the Maoists, whose leaders, 
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following the cessation of conflict, are in the highest levels of the Nepali government. In my 
observations, the government office accepting complaints in Bardiya was often filled with 
conflict victims, and the two staff members were constantly expressing how overwhelmed they 
felt assisting victims to file complaints. Due to the lack of staff members, victims requiring 
assistance were forced to wait and those giving statements verbally forced to do so without 
privacy. Thus, again, victims’ pre-war access to education influenced their ability to participate 
in state-led truth-seeking processes. Conversely, in Kathmandu, I rarely witnessed victims 
waiting more than fifteen minutes to meet with a staff member. Conversations with members of 
both commissions revealed they were aware of these barriers and unwilling to facilitate more 
inclusive processes. 
For victims who were literate, the complaint forms were prohibitive in their language and 
space. Victims were given minimal space in which to write, and the complaint form requested 
that victims describe the “gross violation of human rights.” As Robins (2011:78) argues 
regarding the use of human rights language in processes of transitional justice in Nepal, “the 
privileging of an external discourse can empower elites and outsiders at the expense of victims, 
particularly the most disempowered, who have both the greatest needs and the least access to the 
language of rights.” Further reestablishing power dynamics, marginalization, and exclusion, the 
Government of Nepal and the commissions approved and printed all complaint forms in Nepali 
and failed to hire staff fluent in other languages. The latest census, conducted in 2011, lists 123 
languages spoken in Nepal.  
The paper format, the language of the forms, the failure to hire staff fluent in languages 
other than Nepali or to provide a private space during the complaint-taking processes all 
reproduced the historical exclusion and marginalization of victims from the indigenous Tharu 
community. As in the Interim Relief Program discussed in Chapter 5, the policies and practices 
of Nepal’s truth commissions also demonstrate the politics of victimhood under the guise of 
redressing conflict-era violations. Victims were reduced to a single criterion or essence within a 
reconstituted display of exclusionary nationalism (see Calhoun 1997:18 on nationalist 
essentialism). As Calhoun (1997:50) argues,  
traditions are not simply inherited, they have to be reproduced; stories have to be told 
over and again, parts of traditions have to be adapted to new circumstances to keep them 
meaningful… 
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Within the context of state-led truth commissions, among the stories powerful government 
officials tell are that everyone in Nepal is both literate and Nepali speaking. The restrictions 
imposed upon truth telling through written forms only available in Nepali highlight how the state 
enforces and legitimizes historically embedded forms of homogenous and exclusionary 
nationalism. Aspects of Nepal’s tradition of homogeneous nationalism have been simultaneously 
reproduced and adapted to create a façade of inclusion, and yet, the performance of inclusion in 
Nepal’s truth commissions only reproduces entrenched patterns of exclusion. 
Further, the commissions, focused on gathering evidence, required victims to provide 
documentation of the human rights violations they claimed to have experienced during Nepal’s 
armed conflict. Members of both commissions repeatedly told me in interviews that they would 
not review “complaints” that did not include sufficient evidence. This stipulation, in particular, 
illuminates how the commissions performed inclusion while systemically placing barriers upon 
victims marginalized from state processes. Without connections to the UN or an international 
non-governmental organization, torture victims in Bardiya would have to seek “evidence” from 
their torturers. I contend the stipulations placed upon victims were implemented to conceal state 
complicity and protect political leaders from prosecution.  
When I first met Anil in April 2016, he was aware of both truth-seeking commissions but 
said he would not file a complaint due to his distrust of the process. He later filed a complaint 
with the disappearance commission describing his knowledge about the death and burial of 
fellow prisoners at the army barracks where he was held and also to the truth commission 
concerning his own arrest and torture. In subsequent conversations, Anil talked about his 
irritation with the process of filing a complaint with the truth commission. Staff from the 
commissions told him that if he wanted his complaint to be considered then he must provide 
evidence of his arrest and torture. Yet, due to his age (younger than 18) at the time of his arrest, 
his name was excluded from the reports he filed with the OHCHR and the National Human 
Rights Commission.  
Thus, although the TRC policy explicitly states priority would be given to “children,” 
Anil’s age at the time he filed reports of torture created additional barriers to his inclusion in 
state-led truth-seeking processes. When he went to the National Human Rights Commission in 
Kathmandu, their office stated they did not have documentation of his arrest or torture. Further, 
the Government of Nepal requested the OHCHR to leave the country following the release of the 
   89 
2012 conflict report. Anil asked if I would help him to contact the OHCHR. Although we both 
initiated contact with the OHCHR in an attempt to help Anil to receive the documentation 
required by the TRC, we never received a response. After returning to the NHRC and explaining 
the details of his arrest and torture, the office agreed to provide the report he had filed.  
Kumar also decided to file a complaint with TRC. He learned about the process through 
Priya and filed when the LPC staff, along with Priya and another member of a victims’ 
organization, assisted victims in his village to file complaints. He didn’t have “evidence” of his 
torture, but submitted a complaint anyway hoping for “anything…if they provided something, it 
would be good.” He also expressed his desire for medical treatment, financial compensation, the 
prosecution of his torturer, and an escape for his children from kamaiya labor.  
Anil and Kumar both experienced torture as children at the hands of the state despite their 
divergent residences, access to resources, and caste membership. However, members of TRC 
explained to me that given the high number of complaints they received, they were giving 
priority to complaints with the greatest documentation. More specifically, members of the 
commission explained, they would not investigate complaints without sufficient evidence, and 
subsequently, Nepalis filing complaints without sufficient evidence would likely not be 
recommended for financial reparations, compensation for medical treatment, vocational training, 
or scholarships. Yet, members of both commissions expressed their intention to investigate and 
recommend financial reparations for complaints with sufficient evidence. When I questioned 
members of the commissions on what constituted sufficient evidence, they explained paper 
documentation from the National Human Rights Commission, a non-governmental organization 
or international non-governmental organization, a police report, and/or a letter from a local peace 
committee would be accepted as evidence. But, as my research showed, not all victims of 
Nepal’s armed conflict had access to reporting and documentation.  
In an interview with a physician from a prominent non-governmental organization in 
Kathmandu who worked with torture victims during the armed conflict, he stated that most 
torture victims in Nepal are from marginalized communities without access to powerful political 
connections. When they lack political connections, he continued, they don’t have the option of 
filing a police report because the police are typically involved in victims’ torture. While this non-
governmental organization was able to provide some medical treatment to torture victims, the 
staff lamented not having sufficient funding to follow up with victims. None of the torture 
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victims I interviewed in Bardiya had received financial compensation or medical treatment for 
their torture. In November 2016, the Supreme Court ordered the TRC to investigate all cases. 
Yet, members of the commission continually stated a complaint without sufficient evidence 
would not be investigated further. Given the commission’s lack of sufficient staff to investigate 
more than 58,000 cases, if they’re reviewed at all, it’s more likely that victims with greater 
access to mechanisms of reporting will have their cases examined. If so, this may subsequently 
lead to their receiving financial compensation or medical care to the exclusion of victims who 
couldn’t provide sufficient evidence.  
Conclusion 
Victims’ positionalities have determined their access to transitional justice mechanisms in 
Nepal; state-led truth commissions systemically excluded the most marginalized victims. 
Victims’ preexisting access to knowledge and resources determined their ability to share their 
knowledge or “truth” of their conflict-era human rights violations with the truth-seeking 
commissions. Many victims wonder what kind of truth will be produced through Nepal’s TRC 
and CIEDP given the political influence of the members of both commissions. Rather than 
redress the human rights violations they experienced during armed conflict, through the 
exclusion of victims generally, and marginalized groups specifically, processes of transitional 
justice in Nepal have entrenched inequality and distrust in the government. My interviewees, 
including Anil and Kumar, who were tortured as children described their ongoing fear and 
distrust of the Nepal government, the police, and the Army.  
In Chapters 4 and 5, I described how victims’ pre-war positionalities have impacted their 
lives during the “transitional period.” In this chapter, the construction of “childhood” and the 
performed inclusion of “children” are illuminated through ethnographic research with people 
who, according to international law, are the intended beneficiaries of state-led transitional justice 
mechanisms prioritizing children. Within this context, power has been restructured to present a 
façade of inclusion through policies mandating that people from politically underrepresented 
groups serve as members of Nepal’s truth commissions and that the commissions give priority to 
“children,” among other groups. I contend the performance of the inclusion of “children” and 
historically excluded groups in truth-seeking processes serve to maintain historically sedimented 
patterns of exclusion. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Summary 
 
During my preliminary research, children were often cited in interviews as “the most 
affected” by Nepal’s armed conflict. And yet, 14 months of ethnographic research revealed the 
concept of “children” within the context of transitional justice in Nepal is contested and 
politicized. State-led transitional justice policies, although they mention “children,” do not 
include stipulations for people who were children during the conflict that have now transitioned 
into adulthood. In practice, this is confusing, because Nepal’s armed conflict started in 1996 and 
ended with the signing of the peace agreement in 2006. However, the only state-led mechanisms 
actualized thus far for victims of conflict-era human rights violations, the Interim Relief Program 
and “complaint-taking” through two truth commissions, were implemented in 2008 and 2016 
respectively. Although “children” are included in transitional justice policies, members of both 
truth commissions gave divergent responses regarding definitions of “children” and what their 
inclusion might mean more than ten years after the cessation of conflict. 
This dissertation highlights how, in Nepal, access to mechanisms of transitional justice 
mimics historical patterns of inequality and marginalization. While the Interim Relief Program 
included scholarships for “children,” the stipulations, especially the policy defining children as 
younger than 18, to qualify for and obtain the scholarships ensured some children’s exclusion. 
Significantly, not all children were excluded. Interviews with members of both truth 
commissions revealed the semblance, if not the practice, of inclusion and equality were 
perceived as important. These findings led me to examine the ways in which inclusion is 
performed through processes of transitional justice. I contend the performance of inclusion 
through state-led transitional justice mechanisms serves to conceal the state’s commitment to 
maintaining structural inequality. Further, the façade of inclusion functions as a distraction from 
the demands for the social, economic, and political inclusion of marginalized groups on which 
the armed conflict was fought.  
People implementing transitional justice and peacebuilding mechanisms to help children 
cited their own powerlessness to change systems of power that entrenched exclusion and 
inequality. Transitional justice processes are typically employed alongside a liberal 
peacebuilding model where democracy is touted as a bastion of freedom for all who reside 
within the manmade boundaries of the state. Yet, in the Introduction, my interview with Udaya 
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highlights that even within the UN system, freedom is illusory. Global systems of power, as 
exemplified through the UN, ensure the continued exclusion of marginalized states from greater 
access to resources and power. Further, when “democracy” is implemented through international 
aid, national political leaders are beholden to diplomats, donors, and the UN rather than 
accountable to their citizens. The influx of international aid in Nepal has, till now, increased 
economic inequality between people with the greatest access to resources and people living in 
extreme poverty. Much like the performance of the inclusion of children in transitional justice 
processes, this begs the question: who and what do such illusions serve? Who benefits when 
constraint is recognized as freedom and exclusion is performed through policies of inclusion and 
redress? And, within these contexts where freedom and inclusion are performed, who has the 
power and resources to negotiate and benefit from these structures?  
In this dissertation, I examine how state-led processes of transitional justice serve as a 
distraction from claims for equitable access to power and resources. This is particularly salient 
within the Nepali context where the armed conflict was launched in a highly unequal society 
with a history of feudalism. However, neither the conflict nor the “transitional period” have 
redressed historically sedimented inequality and marginalization. Nepal’s current (2015) 
constitution stipulates that nothing shall prevent special arrangements for the advancement, 
empowerment, protection, and political representation of specific groups: victims of conflict, 
families of the disappeared, women, children, laborers, the economically poor, Khas Arya, Dalit, 
Adivasi Janajatis, Maheshis, Tharus, and other communities. Yet, the vast majority of Nepal’s 
political leaders are Khas Arya, and the dominance of both the Nepali language and Hindu 
religion are associated with Khas Arya migration into Nepal. The named inclusion of Khas Arya, 
the traditionally politically and economically dominant group, as a protected group with Nepal’s 
latest constitution ensures historically sedimented power structures can be maintained. There 
have been changes over the last twenty years, to be sure, and inclusion has been performed in 
various iterations: a peace agreement with provisions for social and economic justice for 
marginalized groups; the drafting of a new constitution codifying the right to equality and 
establishing Nepal as a multiethnic, multi-religious, and multicultural federal democratic 
republic with special arrangements for specific groups; and transitional justice policies that list 
women, children, and indigenous groups as priorities. Nevertheless, my research demonstrates 
how Nepali elites have reorganized to secure their grasp on power while claiming to redress 
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conflict-era rights violations. Dominant ideologies of nation-states and nationalism present 
particular geographic boundaries as containing a homogenous group of people who can be 
understood by certain simple characteristics. The primacy of the Nepali language in education, 
land contracts, and governance is one example of how homogenizing ideologies of nationalism 
have excluded the majority of the population. 
In the Introduction, Udaya describes how international development frameworks and 
homogeneous iterations of nationalism, particularly as exemplified through Nepal’s formal 
education system, are the “cause of violence” and “‘unpeace’ in the life of Nepali people.” 
Further, international development policies led to the proliferation of private English-medium 
schools, which have only widened the gap in access to resources, namely lucrative employment 
in Kathmandu and abroad, between historically privileged and marginalized groups. Chapter 5 
examines the significance of education in Nepal and the long history of inequitable access to 
schooling. During the armed conflict, Maoists sought to combat inequitable access to education 
by banning private schools; both private and public schools were significant sites during the 
armed conflict as school buildings, teachers, and students were affected by Maoist combatants 
and state security forces. I examine the meanings that victims and their families in Bardiya 
assigned to education and their experiences of inequitable access to scholarships targeting 
“conflict affected children” as part of Nepal’s Interim Relief Program and contend knowing/not 
knowing are utilized to conceal systems of power that ensure the continued exclusion of Nepal’s 
most marginalized groups. I argue the barriers conflict victims in Bardiya experienced trying to 
access scholarships demonstrate not only that structural inequality still exists during the 
“transitional” period but also that the state is committed to maintaining it. 
Inequality on the basis of diverse identities within Nepal was presented as a problem that 
could be dealt with through the named inclusion of certain groups within transitional justice and 
nation-building policies. Despite hundreds of years of structured exclusion based on various 
aspects of people’s identities, named groups targeted through transitional justice mechanisms, 
such as “children” were treated as static and homogenous. In this dissertation, I challenge 
homogenous and fixed conceptualizations of “children” and “the local” and analyze the diverse 
and dynamic ways in which people experience armed conflict and its aftermath as I examine how 
power also reorganizes in dynamic ways.  
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In Nepal, transitional justice is utilized, politicized, and manipulated by powerful 
domestic and international actors. The UN, along with most international non-governmental 
organizations, diplomats, and donors, boycotted Nepal’s truth commissions for, among other 
reasons, their politicization and the inclusion of amnesty provisions for gross violations of 
human rights. This position obscures the role of international development in increasing 
economic inequality and marginalization in Nepal, the complicity of international actors (i.e. the 
U.S., the U.K., and India) in providing logistical and financial support to state security forces as 
they committed gross violations of human rights against civilians, and the international 
community’s prioritization of liberal peacebuilding rather than redress for the poorest and most 
marginalized victims through access to basic resources. Following ten years of armed conflict to 
ameliorate structural inequality, state-led transitional justice mechanisms have served to entrench 
the exclusion of economically, politically, and socially marginalized groups and ensure Nepalis’ 
continued distrust in the national government. Thus, while addressing structural inequality may 
be beyond the reach of normative transitional justice mechanisms, the Nepali context 
demonstrates how processes of transitional justice cannot redress conflict-era gross violations of 
human rights without redressing inequitable systems of power. 
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